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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this qualitative content analysis was to examine how amici curiae frame
policy preferences in amicus briefs submitted before the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark case, Espinoza v. Montana (2020). The questions addressed in this study were what
dominant policy frames do interest groups use to frame policy preference in Espinoza v.
Montana (2020), and which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerged in the
written opinions of the United States Supreme Court?
Five a priori codes based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames were used
to analyze 18 out of 45 amicus briefs and seven justices’ written opinions to identify which
dominant frames emerged. The a priori codes included the attribution of responsibility frame,
conflict frame, economic consequences frame, human interest frame, and morality frame. Using
NVivo qualitative software, the researcher coded 1005 references across 18 amicus briefs and
180 references across seven written justices’ opinions for a total of 1185 references. The
documents were coded on two separate occasions resulting in an .85 intra-rater reliability.
Dominant frames were identified for petitioners and respondents and for the written opinions of
the Supreme Court justices.
The most dominant frame across the amicus briefs and justices’ written opinions was the
human interest fame. The next dominant fame was the conflict frame, and the third most
dominant frame was the attribution of responsibility frame. The least dominant frames were the
economic consequences frame and the morality frame respectively.
This study’s major limitation’s is that its primary focus was on the United States Supreme
Court case Espinoza v. Montana (2020). Its applicability to other court cases should be called
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into question. A much broader study must be undertaken before the results of this study can be
generalized to other court cases.
Although more research is needed to determine if Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000)
frames used in this study by amici curiae influenced judicial opinion in Espinoza, one
implications of this study finds that frame analysis is a viable framework for studying how amici
frame policy preferences in attempts to influence judicial outcomes.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
In Espinoza v. Montana (“Espinoza”) the Supreme Court of the United States made a
stunning ruling in the national debate over school choice when it handed down a favorable
decision to proponents of state funded school vouchers.1 The decision came in the form of tuition
tax credits when the Court reversed and remanded the Montana’s Supreme Court ruling in a 5-4
decision, holding that the Montana State Constitution violated the free exercise clause of the
United States Constitution in relation to its tax credit program. In 2015 the Montana state
legislature passed a tax credit scholarship program designed to extend school choice in K-12
education to students who attend private school programs.2 The Montana program offered to
match an income tax credit to state taxpayers who donated up to $150.00 to organizations
offering scholarships.3 To guarantee compliance with the Montana State Constitution, the state’s
department of revenue enacted Rule 1, a “no aid” clause which prohibited recipients from using
the funds at religiously affiliated schools.4 In December 2015, Kendra Espinoza and two other
women whose children attended a private religious school challenged the rule contending that
the rule violated the Religion and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court’s ruling was significant because it signaled its support to end state practices
that denied generally available state funds to faith-based organizations, and it provided a major
lift to proponents of school choice (Russo & Thro, 2021).
School choice is an umbrella term for a variety of programs that offer parents and

1
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020). Hereinafter this case will be referred to in the
text as Espinoza v. Montana (2020) or Espinoza.
2
Mont. Code Ann. § 15-30-3101 (Nexis Uni current through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
3
Mont. Code Ann. § 15-30-3102 (Nexis Uni current through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
4
Mont. Const. Art. X, § 6 (Nexis Uni current through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
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students the option to attend a school other than their zoned public school (Wang, et al., 2019).
There are at least two categories for school choice: public and private (Skinner, 2019). Public
school choice refers to educational choices offered within the public school system such as
charter schools, magnet schools, or open enrollment. Private school choice options generally
involve the transfer of public funds in the form of school vouchers, education saving accounts,
and scholarship tax credits paid directly to parents to use at a private school of their choice
(Skinner, 2019). Although there are several public-school choice options available to parents and
students in most states, this study focused primarily on private-school choice programs funded in
part or whole using public monies. The most prevalent school choice options in the United States
are described in Table 1.
Private-School Choice
Prior to Espinoza, some states had already implemented tax credit scholarship programs.
According to Kafer (2003), Arizona implemented the first tax credit scholarship program in
1997, and Florida and Alabama followed suit in 2001. Currently there are 27 voucher programs
in 16 states and the District of Columbia (Erwin, et. al., 2021). Private-school options include
voucher programs, often called state scholarship programs, education savings accounts, and tax
credit scholarships (Erwin, et. al., 2021). Vouchers, or scholarship programs, allow students to
use public monies to attend a private school of their choice. Education Savings Accounts make a
portion of funds spent by the state at local public schools available to parents in the form of a
spending account to use for private school tuition or other specified services (Cowen, 2019).
Currently there are six states which offer ESA programs. Except for West Virginia, each state
requires students who receive ESA funds to have a disability (Erwin, et. al., 2021). Tax credit
scholarships allow individuals and corporations to receive a tax deduction in exchange for
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Table 1
School Choice Options in the United States

School Choice Category

Type of
Option

Description

Zoned Public Schools

Public

Allows parents to choose to send their students to
their zoned neighborhood public school.

Charter Schools

Public

Semi-autonomous public schools that are exempt
from many of the rules and regulations traditional
public schools must follow.

Magnet Schools

Public

Open Enrollment

Public

Themed based public schools that have a broader
geographic boundary than traditional public
schools.
Allows parents to choose a public school outside of
their assigned public-school zone.

Home Schools

Private

Tax Credit Scholarships

Private

School Vouchers

Private

Publicly funded scholarships provided to parents
who want their student to attend a school that is not
a locally assigned school. Vouchers redirect state
and local public-school funds by giving money
directly to the parents on behalf of the student rather
than the local school district.

Education Savings
Account

Private

Government authorized savings accounts for parents
to use for K-12 educational expenses.

Allows parents to educate their children at home
instead of sending them to traditional public or
private schools. Parents who chose to home school
must follow guidelines established by the state they
live in.
Provide incentives to businesses and individuals to
donate to a nonprofit organization that provide
private scholarships to eligible students in exchange
for a tax credit from the state.

Note. This author created table includes the most common school choice options in the United
States circa 2022. There may be other types of school choice options available in different states,
school districts, or regions of the United States that are not listed in this table.
3

contributing to student scholarship organizations (SSO). Student scholarship organizations are
non-profit organizations that receive donations from businesses or individuals that in turn
distribute the funds in the form of tuition scholarships to students who attend private schools
(Levin, 2013). Currently, 19 states offer tax credit scholarships (Erwin, et al., 2021).
Pros and Cons of School Choice
The school choice debate is one of the most contested public policy issues in the United
States (Debray-Pelot, et al., 2007). School choice initiatives such as those outlined above are
polarizing as opponents and proponents exhibit deep convictions about their policy preferences.
Proponents of school choice argue that private school vouchers empower parents to make
decisions about their student’s educational needs based on the child’s unique cultural, religious,
or academic needs (Scott, 2013). Chubb and Moe (1990) argue that the traditional public school
system has become too institutionalized resulting in a large bureaucracy that is not responsive to
parents or students. They contend that school choice provides an incentive for public schools to
reorganize and become more efficient (Moe & Chubb, 1990). Other proponents argue that
vouchers promote competition between area schools which raises the bar and forces public
schools to improve (Friedman, 1955). Supporters believe vouchers allow all students equal
access to better school opportunities despite of where the student might live, including lowincome children who will have access to schools outside of neglected neighborhoods and low
performing schools (Epple, et al., 2017).
Those who oppose school voucher programs argue that vouchers take money away from
public school systems. These opponents believe financial cuts serve to undermine the value of
public education (Gooden, et al., 2016). Opponents also argue that many parents use publicschool vouchers at religious schools. By allowing the use of tax dollars to pay for secular
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education, opponents argue that voucher programs undermine the separation between church and
state (Sutton & King, 2011). Furthermore, many opponents believe that vouchers do not benefit
all students since private schools can pick and choose which students to admit. Private schools
can discriminate against LGBQT students, students with disabilities, or students with lower
academic acumen (Eckes, et al., 2016). Opponents argue that vouchers skim the best students
away from public schools (Epple, et al., 2017). Finally, opponents contend that school voucher
programs have the potential to further divide the country by leading to increased racial and
socio-economic segregation (Minow, 2011).
Framing the Issue
Policy debates in the public arena are often framed by interest groups. Malin, et al.
(2021), argue that the language interest groups use to frame the school choice debate may
ultimately shape U.S. educational policy. Interest groups compete to frame arguments in their
favor by using moral arguments that appeal to the general public’s emotions (Malin, et al., 2021).
Interest groups work to influence education policy by directing public opinion towards these
moral arguments and their own organizational goals. According to Minow (2011), the school
choice debate has surfaced no less than five times in United States history, and each time has
offered “choice” as the solution to conflict (p. 816). Table 2 highlights each major period.
Each historic period in Minow’s (2011) analysis creates new challenges for the school
choice movement. Minow (2011) states, “Its seductive frame at times obstructs, and at other
times serves, equal opportunity, antiracism, tolerance, and multiculturalism” (p. 816). Minow
(2011) argues that school choice rhetoric has served multiple purposes over time that has shaped
the debate sometimes with unintended consequences as school choice policies appeal to different
aspects of the American ethos. Hentschke (2017) contends that the arguments for or against
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Table 2
Minow's Five Major Periods of Legal, Political, and Cultural Conflict Over School Choice in the
United States.

Historic Period/Overarching Frame

Time
Period

Issues and Concerns

Choice as individual religious and
contractual liberty

1900-1925

Nativist opposition to immigration; Nativist attempt to pass
compulsory school law requiring all students attend public
schools. Culminated in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)
when the Supreme Court struck down the Oregon law and
maintained the right of parental choice in the education of
children.5

Choice as resistance to racial
desegregation

1950-1960

In wake of Brown v. Board of Educ. (1954) private
schooling became a way to evade court ordered
desegregation.6

Choice as an instrument of racial
desegregation

1970-1980

Liberals and progressives see school choice in form of
vouchers as an opportunity for low-income families to exit
failing schools and have access to private schools or Magnet
schools.

Choice as an instrument of
educational opportunity – and the
triumph of religious school
campaigns for public funding

1990-2008

Ushers in revival of calls for public funding of religious
schools. Advocates argue that this policy opens the door for
low-income students to attend private religious schools and
escape failing public neighborhood schools. Challenged
earlier court interpretations of the Establishment Clause
culminating in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).7

Choice for pluralism and school
reform and renewed risk of the
regime of separate but equal
schooling

2008-2011

System creates multiple issues that may led to renewed
segregation based on identity politics. Integration across
racial, religious, and other demographic differences enables
new forms of segregation. Schools based on gender,
disability, language, sexual identity, and other personal traits
have emerged.

Note. Adapted from “Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American
Pluralism” by Minow, M., 2011, Yale Law Journal, 120, p. 814 -848.

5
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Hereinafter this case will be referred to in the text as
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) or Pierce.
6
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Hereinafter this case will be referred to in
the text as Brown v. Board of Ed. (1954) or Brown.
7
Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Hereinafter this case will be referred to in the text as
Zelman v. Harris-Simmons (2002) or Zelman.
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school choice in all its variant forms is designed to persuade and convince and often “serve as a
proxy for some other, larger issues, such as school equity or racial integration” (p. 31). These
issues are often framed by special interest groups who communicate with carefully chosen words
and phrases associated with a desired issue frame (Brown, 2020).
Ultimately, school choice is a process whereby interest groups continuously evaluate it
and seek to actively change it through collective political action. This activity may result in
policy and legislation changes favorable to the policy preference of the intertest groups actively
seeking change but may not necessarily be the policy preference of the general voter (DebrayPelot, et al., 2007). Debray-Pelot, et al. (2007), point out that most school choice gains have been
made through legislative and judicial action and not the ballot box. The most recent win came in
the form of the United States Supreme Court case Espinoza v. Montana (2020).8
Friends of the Court
Espinoza catapulted the issue of state funded vouchers to the national level capturing the
attention of interest groups from across the political spectrum.9 Amici curiae, acting on behalf of
interest groups which included a wide range of think tanks, state coalitions, 131 legislators and
governors, teacher unions or affiliations, and religious organizations filed 45 amicus briefs either
in opposition to or support of the lower court’s decision. Amici curiae or “friends of the court”
submit briefs on behalf of interest groups who hope to exert influence over the court to obtain a
win for their policy preference (Collins, Corley, & Hamner, 2014). Initially, amicus briefs were
used to clarify contested points of law by legal experts whose legal prowess was highly sought
by judges (Mohan, 2010). Today, however, amicus briefs are used by interest groups as a tool to
introduce policy preferences into the courts (Kearney & Merrill, 2000).

8
9

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
Ibid.
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The use of amicus briefs has proliferated in recent years. Kearney and Merrill (2000)
noted in their seminal research on the influence of amicus briefs on the United States Supreme
Court that the use of amicus briefs in the period from 1946-1995 had increased 800%. Collins
(2004) noted that during this same period amicus curiae often formed alliances with other
interest groups and individual policy actors as co-signers on briefs, so the actual number of
participants also increased significantly. Other scholars have observed a similar phenomenon in
the increase of amicus briefs and co-signers filed in United States Supreme Court cases dealing
with race-conscious admission policies in higher education, special education law, and
transgender student inclusion in K-12 public schools (Garces, et al., 2017; Lewis & Bray, 2019;
Lewis & Eckes, 2020; Marin, et al., 2020). Larsen and Devins (2016) argue that the Courts’
desire for information outside the legal record fuel what they call the “amicus machine” (p.
1902). Amici curiae acting on behalf of interest groups are part of the machine because they
provide the supplemental non-legal information that the courts would otherwise not receive
(Larsen and Devins, 2016).
Some studies support the view that amicus briefs do have some impact on United States
Supreme Court decisions (Frankenberg & Garces, 2008; Garces, 2013; Morgan & Pullin, 2010).
As a result, this has generated an interest in the examination of the influence amicus briefs may
have on educational policy and law. Lewis and Bray (2019) argue that further examination of the
use of amicus briefs by interest groups as a tool to influence courts should be pursued because
briefs offer interest groups important opportunities to present non-legal arguments that provide
context to issues beyond the disputed legal scope. Marin et al. (2018) echoes the same call
arguing that briefs provide amici the opportunity to influence educational policy outcomes that
otherwise might remain entangled in the political arena. Horn, et al. (2020) noted that in the past
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twenty years the United States Supreme Court has issued several significant education-related
decisions that have shaped education policy nationally. In each case multiple interest groups filed
amicus briefs to promote their policy preference. Yet, despite the perceived impact the Court has
on shaping education policy, studies on the policy frames interest groups use in amicus briefs to
communicate their policy preferences before the Court are incomplete. The lack of research in
this area limits scholars understanding of how interest groups may influence Supreme Court
decisions by means of the amicus brief process (Collins, 2008).
Statement of the Problem
As mentioned above, Minow (2011) points out that there are at least five periods in
United States history in which various groups have shaped the school choice debate, and each
period has ushered in as many social problems as it has solved. A policy frame is ultimately the
end result of the process of shaping the interpretation of a social problem in a direction that
drives a particular groups policy preference. Exactly how these groups frame policy preferences
is an under studied area of education policy. As Collins, et al. (2015) have noted, research related
to the use of amicus briefs as a vehicle to influence United State Supreme Court decisions is not
new. The focus by researchers on the content interest groups use to frame policy preferences
communicated in amicus briefs, however, is relatively new and not fully understood. Most
studies primarily focus on the extent to which amicus briefs add new information to the case, or
they provide a count of the number of social science citations referenced in the briefs. Yet,
systematic studies of the documents content for frames or themes are limited (Collins, 2007;
Collins, 2008; Collins, et al., 2015; Hazelton, et al., 2019). According to Garces, et al. (2017) this
is especially true in the area of education policy.

9

Espinoza is an ideal case for exploring the content interest groups use to frame policy
preferences in amicus briefs for several reasons:10
1. Interest groups representing a large ideological swath filed briefs in this case.
2. The ruling is timely because it continues to raise questions about the Religion and Equal
Protection Clauses which are often cited in school choice debates.
3. It raises questions concerning the legitimacy of excluding private religious schools from
receiving public funds that otherwise are distributed to non-sectarian private schools.
4. The case has renewed the school choice movement as evidenced by subsequent court
cases in other states to defeat “no-aid” clauses (McCartney, 2021).
The most prominent of these subsequent cases is Carson v. Makin (2021) which was granted
certiorari on July 2, 2021.11 This case also deals with school funding in the form of tuition
assistance as it relates to the states’ “no aid” clause. The question before the Court is essentially
the same question as in Espinoza:
Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding
for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses or the Equal Protection Clause of the
federal Constitution?12
In Carson amici curiae representing a broad range of interest groups and policy actors filed more
than 40 amicus briefs. The relevancy of these two cases makes it timely for scholars to examine
the policy frames interest groups present in amicus briefs and how those policy frames may (or
may not) present themselves in the United States Supreme Court’s justices’ opinions.13

10

Ibid.
Carson v. Makin, No. 20–1088 (2021). Hereinafter this case will be referred to in the text as Carson v.
Makin (2021) or Carson. https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-1088.html.
12
Espinoza v. Montana (2020).
13
Carson v. Makin (2021).
11

10

Limited studies focusing on how interest groups frame policy preferences submitted
before the Court in amicus briefs has hindered our understanding of how interest groups may (or
may not) influence justices’ opinions. The opinions of the justices ultimately shape education
law and policy in the form of written decisions rendered by the court. These decisions have
repercussions for all of us. When the court rules on a case as it did in Espinoza the justice’s
opinions not only set precedent but often influence the standards that shape societal norms.14
Purpose Statement
Scholars have attempted to identify policy frames by conducting content analyses of a
variety of different data published by interest groups. Interest groups communicate policy
preferences through news media outlets (television and newspapers), social media (Facebook,
YouTube, blogs, Tweeter, Reddit, and the Internet), policy reports, legislative bills, messaging
platforms, and speeches (Van Gorp, 2010; Feuerstein, 2014; Shanahan, et al., 2011). Although
framing studies have been conducted using different data types, few education policy studies
using amicus briefs as the tool to identify the content or themes used by interest groups to frame
policy preferences have been conducted (Collins, 2007; Collins, 2008; Collins, et al., 2015;
Hazelton, et al., 2019; Garces, et al., 2017; Horn, et al., 2020; Lewis & Bray, 2019; Marin, et al.,
2018). This study sought to identify the dominant policy frames interest groups used to frame
policy preferences in Espinoza by conducting a qualitative content analysis of the amicus briefs
and written opinions of the justices.15 This study addressed the following goals:
1. This study determined which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerged
in the written opinions of the justices in Espinoza.
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2. This study contributed to current understanding of how different themes and policy
frames chosen by interest groups to frame their policy preferences may (or may not)
have influenced the Courts’ opinion in Espinoza, and ultimately education policy and
law.
3. This study built upon the work of other scholars who have examined the role interest
groups play in influencing education policy submitted in cases related to race-conscious
admissions in higher education, special education law, and transgender student inclusion
(Garces, et al., 2017; Lewis & Bray, 2019; Lewis & Eckes, 2020; Marin, et al., 2020).
The conceptual framework for this study was frame analysis which was used to identify the
content of the policy frames and themes that emerged across the amicus briefs and justices’
written opinions.
Research Questions
This qualitative content analysis was guided by two research questions that focused on
the contents of amicus briefs submitted by interest groups to the United States Supreme Court in
the landmark case Espinoza v. Montanan (2020).16 The questions this study addressed are:
RQ1. What dominant policy frames do interest groups use to frame policy preferences
in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)?
RQ2. Which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerge in the written
opinions of the United States Supreme Court justices in Espinoza v. Montana
(2020)?

16
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Significance of the Study
As the United States becomes more politically polarized it becomes more difficult to
create education policy through the legislative process (Plank & Boyd, 1994). Consequently,
some education political actors are by-passing the legislative arena and using the judicial arena to
influence educational policy decisions (Horn, et al., 2020). Education policy actors do this by
submitting amicus briefs designed to sway the courts toward preferred policies. However, there
are very few educational policy studies that focus on the use of amicus briefs in the judicial
arena. There are even fewer studies that analyze the frames and themes that emerge in the briefs
in relation to how they might influence judicial opinion. This study may potentially be the first
education policy study to address this concern. This insight may help education policy leaders
better understand how interest groups influence judicial decision making in the education policy
arena.
Operational Definitions
This research aims to avoid ambiguity; therefore, the following definitions will apply to
the terms used throughout this paper:
1. Amici Curiae/amici/amicus briefs – Individuals or groups who file “friend of the court”
briefs, or legal briefs on behalf of an individual or interest groups who is not a party to
the case but has an interest in the outcome of the case (Collins, et al., 2014).
2. Concurring Opinion – An opinion that agrees with the majority opinion in a court case
but not necessarily the rationale behind the decision. The concurring judge writes a
separate opinion that provides a rationale for their individual decision (Concurring
Opinion. (n.d.). Https://www.Law.Cornell.Edu/Wex/Concurring_opinion. Retrieved May
14, 2022, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/concurring_opinion).
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3. Dissenting Opinion – An opinion that disagrees with the majority opinion in a court case.
The dissenting judge writes a separate opinion that provides a rationale for their opposing
decision (Dissent. (n.d.). Https://www.Law.Cornell.Edu/Wex/Dissent. Retrieved May 14,
2022, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dissent).
4. Education Equity – Belief that all students should receive the resources they need so they
graduate prepared for success after high school (Barth, 2016).
5. Equal Protection Clause – Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution which extends to the states the duty to provide equal protection of the laws
under the United States Constitution to all citizens (Equal Protection Clause. (n.d.).
Https://www.Law.Cornell.Edu/Wex/Equal_protection. Retrieved May 14, 2022, from
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equal_protection).
6. Frame Analysis – A multi-disciplinary social science research method used to understand
how policy elites frame issues relevant to their cause and use them to exploit and
manipulate the general public or targeted audience to support their unique view or
perspective on a topic. Frame analysis is used in communication studies, political
science, psychology, sociology, and other social sciences (Entman, 1993; Druckman,
2001; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Iyengar, 1994).
7. Interest Groups – A group or organization formed by individuals that share similar
political interests. These individuals come together to push public policy in a desired
direction. These groups can be philanthropic, religious, or civic organizations that come
together episodically, or they can be permanently involved in politics. The ultimate goal
of members of these groups is not to seek public office, but to influence policy outcomes
through formal and informal interactions with policymakers (Beyers, et al., 2008).
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8. Justices’ Opinions/Judicial Opinions – For this study these terms refer to the United
States Supreme Court written statements explaining the Courts decision for a case
(Opinion. (n.d.). Https://www.Law.Cornell.Edu/Wex/Opinion. Retrieved May 14, 2022,
from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinion).
9. Majority Opinion – For this study this term refers to the United States Supreme Court
judicial opinion that was joined by more than half the justices deciding the case (Opinion.
(n.d.). Https://www.Law.Cornell.Edu/Wex/Opinion. Retrieved May 14, 2022, from
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinion).
10. Policy Frame – The end result of the process of shaping the interpretation of a social
problem in a direction that drives a particular groups policy preference. Often times,
multiple frames can compete with each other in hopes of gaining the public or targeted
groups favor on a policy issue (Entman, 1993; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).
11. Political Actors – Groups and individuals, including members of local and state boards of
education, superintendents, teachers, and community stakeholders (i.e., parents and
business organizations), interest groups, think tanks, religious organizations, media,
individual legislators at the local, state, and federal level, as well as philanthropists in a
position to influence policy either through the legislative or judicial process (Bell &
Stevenson, 2006).
12. Policy Elite – Political actors who actively promote policy ideas, policy agendas, and
energize the diffusion process (Mintrom, 1997). These individuals are often associated
with political parties, interest groups, think-tanks, and other. They actively seek to initiate
policy change by identifying policy problems that attract the attention of policy decision
makers at the local, state, or national level (Kingdon, 1984).
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13. Private Religious Schools (or Private Faith-based Schools) – As used in this study, a
school sponsored or supported, at least in part, by a religious denomination. These
schools are sometimes also referred to as parochial schools (Martinez-Arino & Teinturier,
2019).
14. Religion Clauses – The Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment in the United States Constitution which guarantees freedom of religion (The
Religion Clauses. (n.d.). Https://www.Law.Cornell.Edu/Constitution-Conan/Amendment1/the-Religion-Clauses. Retrieved May 14, 2022, from
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/the-religion-clauses).
15. School Choice – A variety of programs offering parents voluntary education alternatives
for their students. School choice provides parents who do not want their child to attend an
assigned local school with the option of sending their child to a magnet school, public
charter school, homeschool, inter/intra-district public school, or private school. School
choice allows public education dollars to follow students to a school of choice, including
private secular and non-secular schools (Wang, et al., 2019).
16. School Vouchers – School vouchers are publicly-funded scholarships provided to parents
who want their student to attend a school that is not a locally assigned school. Vouchers
redirect state and local public-school funds by giving money directly to the parents on
behalf of the student rather than the local school district. Parents can use these funds to
send their student to a school of choice, including private secular schools (Carnoy, 2017).
17. Tax Credit Scholarships – A form of school vouchers that provide tax credits to
individuals or corporations that donate to non-profit organizations that provide
scholarships for students to attend private schools (Chou, 2011; Reczka, 2020).
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18. United States Supreme Court – The highest court in the federal judiciary system of the
United States that serves as the final court of appeals. Through the power of judicial
review, the United States Supreme Court has the power to declare a legislative or
executive acts in violation of the United States Constitution (Supreme Court of the United
States. (n.d.). Https://www.Supremecourt.Gov/about/about.Aspx. Retrieved May 14,
2022, from https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/about.aspx).
Limitations
The primary limitation on this study was that qualitative content analysis relies heavily
on the researcher’s interpretation of the text’s relationship with its’ intended audience. Being
aware of my role as researcher was part of the reflexivity process and I had to be constantly
aware of my own biases. Creswell (2014) emphasizes that researchers must understand how their
background may shape the direction of a study, including their professional background. My
personal interest in this study evolves out of my more than 25 years as an educator and
administrator in both public and private settings. This may be seen as a limitation because as the
researcher, I am the primary collector of the data in a study that largely focuses on issues related
to school choice. An additional limitation was that this study focused on one United States
Supreme Court case and the findings may not be generalizable to other cases. To make this
determination additional studies will need to be conducted on other Supreme Court cases.
Delimitations
Delimitations of a study are the boundaries set by the researcher that limit the scope of
the study to ensure that the research does not become so large that it is unmanageable and loses
sight of the study’s original purpose. For the purpose of narrowing the scope of this study, this
study is purposefully limited to one United States Supreme Court case, Espinoza. It is further
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purposefully limited to 18 of the 45 amicus briefs and written opinions of the justices filed in the
case. This study does not include Writs of Certiorari, translations of oral arguments, media
commentary, or any other proceedings or orders related to the case. Furthermore, because this
study is a qualitative content analysis of the amicus briefs and judges’ opinions in Espinoza, the
researcher is unaware of any additional sources that might have been considered by amici or the
justices but not cited in the briefs or rendered opinions to form policy frames.
Organization of the Study
This qualitative content analysis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter I provide a
brief overview of the study. This chapter introduces a summary of Espinoza, and the role amicus
briefs play in providing an avenue for interest groups to introduce policy frames into the legal
system for the purpose of influencing judicial decision making and ultimately educational policy
outcomes. This chapter also includes a statement of the problem, purpose of the study, and
research questions, as well as provides operational definitions relevant to the study. It also
includes delimitations of the study.
Chapter two provides a review of the relevant literature related to the school choice and
voucher’s movement in the United States, Espinoza, the role amicus briefs play in the court
process, and a brief review of the literature related to frame analysis - the process interest groups
use to frame policy preferences and the theoretical lens for this study. Chapter 3 addresses the
methodological design of the study, support for the design, and methodological procedures for
conducting the study. The data analysis and verification procedures are also explained. The
chapter concludes with a description of the characteristics of a qualitative content analysis and
explains the process for data collection and the role of the researcher.
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In fourth chapter I discussed the research findings by offering a description and
summarization of the data. The dominant frames used by interest groups to frame policy
preferences in amicus briefs and those cited by the justices in their written opinions are
presented, along with a discussion of the major themes that emerged from the data found within
each frame. Chapter five concluded the study with a discussion on how the findings extended the
body of literature in the use of frame analysis in analyzing amicus briefs and implications for
educational policy leaders going forward. This chapter provided a summary of the findings and
recommendations for future research. The researchers’ thoughts and reflections on the study
concluded the chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this study was to identify the dominant policy frames interest groups used
to frame policy preferences in Espinoza v. Montana (2020) through a qualitative content analysis
of the amicus briefs filed by interest groups in the case.17 This study also determined if the same
frames emerged in the written opinions rendered by the United States Supreme Court justices.
This study may help education policy researchers develop a better understanding of how
different policy frames and themes chosen by interest groups to frame policy preferences may (or
may not) influence the Courts’ opinion, and ultimately education policy and law. This study was
guided by the following two research questions:
RQ1. What dominant policy frames do interest groups use to frame policy preferences
in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)?
RQ2. Which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerge in the written
opinions of the United States Supreme Court justices in Espinoza v. Montana
(2020)?
Chapter Overview
This literature review was divided into three parts. In Part I, I provided a summary of the
history of the school choice movement through the conceptual lens of Minow’s (2011) school
choice framework. In Part II, I described the events leading up to Espinoza and traced the
trajectory of the case as it made its way to the United States Supreme Court. I also discussed the
Religion Clauses and the United States Supreme Court cases relevant to Espinoza. In Part III, I
discussed frame analysis and how interest groups use framing to influence the courts.
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Literature Review Search Process
The literature review process for this study began with a Boolean search of the University
of Tennessee library databases which included Google Scholar, ERIC, SCOPUS, HeinOnline,
Nexus Uni, and World of Science. These search engines provided peer-reviewed articles, books,
case law, and law reviews utilized in this study. The search terms for articles, books, case law,
and law reviews related to Espinoza included “Espinoza v. Montana” AND “Religion Clauses”
OR “School Vouchers” OR “Tax Credit Scholarship”. This search generated 124 articles, books,
and law reviews published since 2015. In search of articles related to Minow’s (2011) school
choice framework the search terms included “Minow” AND “History of School Choice” OR
“Magnet Schools” which generated 10,600 articles since 2010. Each search was refined to find
specific articles related to Espinoza, tax credit scholarships, and the history of school choice. I
read articles related to each topic covered in each section of this study until I acquired a
command of the literature (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Additional articles, books, and law
reviews were added as the literature was reviewed and relevant articles related to each topic
emerged. In addition, 18 articles from previous research were included in the study.
Part I: Brief History of School Choice
According to Minow (2011), the school choice debate has surfaced no less than five
times in United States history, and each historic period has created new challenges for the school
choice movement. Minow (2011) argues that school choice rhetoric has served multiple purposes
over time that has shaped the debate sometimes with unintended consequences as school choice
policies appeal to different aspects of the American ethos. School choice first emerged as a
“persistent framework” during the late nineteenth century when the compulsory school
movement led to struggles between protestant and non-protestant religious groups (Minow, 2011
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p. 816). Since then, conflicts over public schooling have led to a variety of political and cultural
clashes that include struggles over religious and personal freedoms, civil rights, education equity,
and school reform (Minow, 2011).
Choice as Individual Religious and Contractual Liberty
In 1848 Horace Mann launched a movement in Massachusetts to establish a system of
public schools based on the idea of citizen education as set forth by Jefferson (Cremin, 1951).
Mann’s primary goals were to establish a secularized compulsory education system paid by
means of publicly funded tax dollars and to create a unique American culture and character that
could be used to mold and assimilate many immigrants into mainstream America (Cremin,
1951). Although common schools were open to all white children, they were typically Protestant
in character and frowned upon Catholic teachings in the schools (Cremin, 1951). Tension
mounted between the two groups and in response Catholic leaders created the earliest alternative
to public schools by establishing a system of private Catholic schools (Cremin, 1951). When
Catholic leaders petitioned for the right to use public funds to support Catholic school’s antiCatholic sentiment increased and in 1875 James Blaine proposed an amendment in congress to
prevent the funding of sectarian institutions (Komer, 2009). Although the amendment did not
pass, many states adopted what are now known as Blaine Amendments or “no aid” clauses into
their state constitutions which prohibit state funding of religious schools or institutions (Komer,
2009).
By the turn of the century, as Catholic schools and other types of private schools were
flourishing, anti-Catholic and nativist sentiment grew more intense (Woodhouse, 1992). This
hostility was primarily directed against Germans, Polish, and Scandinavian populations who
settled in communities where they formed their own schools and conducted instruction in their
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native language (Hansen, 1940, as cited in Woodhouse, 1992). This practice led to conflict with
their American born neighbors, and in 1919 several states, including Nebraska, passed legislation
forbidding public and private schools from instructing students in a language other than English
(Luebke, 1980). Conflict further escalated when Oregon also passed a Compulsory Education
Act of 1922 which forbade all children between the ages of eight and sixteen from attending
private schools – including parochial schools (Luebke, 1980).
As hostility grew, many of these state laws were challenged. In 1923 in Meyer v. State of
Nebraska (1923) the United States Supreme Court invalidated the Nebraska law stating that it
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters
(1925), the justices citing Meyer, prohibited Oregon from mandating that all children attend
public schools.19 In both cases the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of parents to
oversee their child’s education and firmly established school choice as a parental right. Yet,
Minow (2011) contends, this decision also produced a dual system where only public schools
received public funding and parents who wished to send their children to private schools had to
rely on private philanthropy or their own financial resources. Minow (2011) argues, “the rhetoric
of choice in this context obscured inequality in economic resources that made the option of
private schools available to some and not to others…” (p. 820). Consequently, this decision
fueled nearly a century of school choice advocacy for public aid for private religious schools.
Choice as Resistance to Racial Segregation
The second period of Minow’s (2011) analysis argues that school choice was used to
avoid desegregation after the Brown v. Board of Education (1954)20 decision which struck down
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the “separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).21 The Court ruled that
laws mandating segregation of the races in schools were a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Those opposed to
desegregation sought ways to avoid complying with the Court’s school desegregation mandate.
Alexander and Alexander (2004) argue that resistance to desegregation was “blatantly
confrontational” as massive opposition lead to social conflict that lasted for more than a decade
(p.1132). White flight from the cities to the suburbs in the north was met by the rise of private
religious academies in the south (Alexander & Alexander, 2004). In addition, middle-class white
parents advocated for the use of tax funded school vouchers to help pay for enrollment at private
parochial schools to circumvent desegregation (Alexander & Alexander, 2004).
The demand for private school vouchers gained momentum in 1955 when Milton
Friedman, a free market economist, published an essay, The Role of Government in Education, in
which he argued for school choice in the form of a voucher program (Friedman, 1955). In the
essay Friedman proposed that parents should receive vouchers to send children to a state
approved school of their choice (Friedman, 1955). These market-based state approved schools
could be sectarian, private non-sectarian schools, or even schools operated for profit. Friedman
(1955) believed market-based schools would encourage competition and less efficient schools
would be forced to improve or close. In footnote No. 2 in the essay, Friedman explicitly
addresses the issue of vouchers being used by segregationist to defy Brown v. Board of
Education (1954).22 In it he states that while he is opposed to forced segregation, he is also
opposed to forced desegregation (Friedman, 1955, p. 52). Friedman argues that privatization of
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public education supported by tax funded vouchers serves as an alternative to traditional schools
because the system of vouchers will allow parents to send their children to any private school
they choose, including all white schools. Ultimately, once the publicly funded voucher is in the
hand of the parent, Friedman argues it would be wrong to prohibit its use in support of racially
segregated schools (Friedman, 1955).
Mead (2008) asserts that those opposed to desegregation used school choice to avoid
compliance with Brown v. Board of Education (1954) by devising plans to resist court-ordered
desegregation.23 In Virginia, state legislators passed a tuition voucher law that allowed for the
closing of public schools but provided publicly funded vouchers so white students could attend
private schools. Mead (2008) writes that state legislators knew that most private schools were
segregated and private programs available to black students were limited. Furthermore, some
southern states opened “freedom of choice” academies which allowed families to choose which
school they wanted their student to attend (p. 4). The plans were ineffective, however, and failed
to desegregate schools (Mead, 2008). For example, in Green v. County School Board (1968), the
Court unanimously decided that the New Kent County, Virginia schools “freedom of choice”
plan was ineffective, and the school district was in violation of the mandate to desegregate.24
Consequently, because of racial politics becoming intertwined with school choice, Friedman’s
school voucher program was unsuccessful (Mead, 2008).
Minow (2011) contends that segregationist during this period used school choice as
justification for avoiding racial integration in public schools. As a result, private schools
“became an avenue for circumventing court‐ordered desegregation in the wake of Brown v.
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Board of Education” (Minow, 2011, p. 821). The use of school choice as a rationale to avoid
desegregation undermined choice as an individual liberty and Friedman’s free-market voucher
proposal (Minow, 2011). The plans segregationist devised to oppose desegregation demonstrated
how “freedom and choice could be empty phrases when underlying structures of opportunity and
attitudes remain unchanged” (Minow, 2011, p. 824). Ultimately, school choice became
synonymous with the racial bigotry and unrest that marred this phase of the school choice
movement.
Choice as an Instrument of Racial Desegregation
Minow (2011) argues that the third phase of school choice ushered in a period where
liberals and progressives embraced Friedman’s school voucher plan as an attempt to support
racial desegregation. By the late 1960s and 1970s, magnet schools emerged as a tool to counter
“white flight” from the urban areas to the suburbs (Rossell, 2005, p. 46). Magnet schools used
market like incentives as means to attract white students to black neighborhoods for their
schooling (Rossell, 2005). White students were offered vouchers to attend magnet schools in the
inner city with specialized curriculums that focused on advanced math, science, technology, or
the arts (Rossell, 2005). Hence, magnet schools were specifically designed to attract white
students away from their assigned public schools by offering curriculum taught through nontraditional instructional methods (Rossell, 2005).
Initially, magnet schools were embraced by school districts across the country to
integrate schools and create racial balance. Goldring and Smrekar (2000) contend that the results
of racial balance are complex and largely depend on school district size, transportation options,
and overall school district demographics. School districts with larger minority demographics
found it harder to desegregate, yet these were the districts that embraced magnet schools
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(Goldring and Smrekar, 2000). In their case study which compared the magnet programs
implemented in two major school districts, St. Louis and Cincinnati, Goldring and Smrekar
(2000) determined that both districts were able to use magnet schools to effectively create
racially balanced schools. Goldring and Smrekar (2000) contend that “on average, African
Americans comprise 60% of magnet school enrollment in St. Louis and about 50% in Cincinnati,
with White students making up the difference” (p. 27). Goldring and Smrekar (2000) report that
magnet schoolteachers in both cities expressed positive “sentiments about the value of racially
integrated schools and were equally impressed with the results of their racially balanced
environments” (p. 28).
Although magnet schools initially seemed to achieve the results they were designed to
achieve (i.e., racial balance in many inner-city schools), as so often happens, school choice in the
form of magnet schools faced legal obstacles. In 1995, a lawsuit against several Boston,
Massachusetts magnet schools that required entrance exams challenged admission policies that
held a certain number of slots for Black and Hispanic students. According to Minow (2011),
Sarah Wessmann, a White ninth grader challenged the policy and persuaded the courts to rule
against the use of race as an admission criterion in competitive admissions (Wessmann v. Gittens,
1998).25 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court case, Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District (2007), also known as the PICS case, found it unconstitutional
to use student identities as a measure to ensure racial balance.26 Minow (2011) argues that
although the courts upheld magnet schools in the early 1970s and 1980s as an avenue for
achieving racial balance in the public schools, by 1995, “the plurality opinion expressly called
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for ending the use of race as a factor when school systems invite students to choose among
educational options”, thus formally ending the use of race as a means to integrate public schools
(p. 828).
Choice as an Instrument of Educational Opportunity
Minow’s (2011) fourth stage of school choice reveals how interest groups coalesce
around school choice to extend vouchers to low-income students to attend private religious
schools. Advocates from free market supporters to backers of public aid to parochial schools
came out in support of publicly funded vouchers for low-income students in poor performing
school districts (Minow, 2011). These advocates joined together to ensure that publicly funded
school choice programs would include private religious schools. Advocacy groups successfully
challenged several earlier Supreme Court decisions which found that state and local statues that
authorized reimbursement of teacher salaries at private religious schools and deductions for
textbooks to parents of students who attended private schools violated the Establishment Clause
(Lemon v. Kurtzman, 197127; Aguilar v. Felton, 198528). According to Minow (2011), these
earlier “decisions stood in the way of using public vouchers to pay for religious schooling, and
unusual bedfellows joined forces for legal change” (p. 829).
Up to this point in Minow’s (2011) analysis, the most successful challenge to earlier
Court decisions was Zelman v. Harris-Simmons (2002).29 This United States Supreme Court case
stemmed from a lawsuit brought against the Cleveland, Ohio public school system which
allowed parents of low-income students who attended low performing schools to use publicly
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funded vouchers to attend a school of choice (McCarthy, 2016). McCarthy (2016) states that
96% of parents chose to enroll their students in private religious schools. The lawsuit argued that
the program violated the Establishment Clause because the program provided taxpayer money to
religious institutions (Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 2002).30 The state of Ohio contended that the
program differed from previous programs in that it did not directly provide funds to the religious
institution; the funding went directly to parents who made the decision as to where to spend the
funds (Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 2002).31 The Court decided in favor of the voucher program
in a 5-4 decision. The majority justices agreed that the intent of the voucher program was to
provide families of students who attended low performing schools with educational choice and
since the parents made the decision which school their student should attend, the voucher
program was not a violation of the Establishment Clause (McCarthy, 2016).
Minow (2011) argues that the Zelman v. Harris-Simmons (2002) decision raises four
major concerns for the use of publicly funded vouchers.32 First, Minow (2011) asserts that
minority students may have limited access to private schools because private programs are scarce
in minority communities, and private schools often only admit the highest performing students.
Second, school voucher programs skim the highest performing students or students whose
parents have “clout”, thus leaving the remaining students behind in poor performing public
schools (Minow, 2011, p. 832). Third, school vouchers accepted at religious institutions risk
pressuring students to attend a school with a religious denomination different from their own
and, conversely, may pressure religious schools to modify their practices so that they can receive
public funds. Last, Minow (2011) raises concern that school choice voucher programs only give
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the “illusion of choice” but are bound by district lines because voucher programs rarely cross
district borders into the suburbs where higher performing public and private schools are
concentrated, thus limiting access to poor urban students (p. 832).
Choice for Pluralism and School Reform
In the last phase of analysis, Minow (2011) evaluates the impact expanding public school
options have on school choice. Public school options include magnet schools, charter schools,
open enrollment, and traditionally zoned public schools – of which charter schools are the fastest
growing option. According to Wells, et al. (2019), charter schools are market-driven schools of
choice that can maneuver within and around neighborhoods and often pick and choose which
students to include in their recruitment process. Wells, et al. (2019), who conducted research on
gentrifying communities in urban neighborhoods, refers to this process as “manufactured” or
“designed” diversity that cater to specific groups (p. 472). Rather than diversifying schools,
charter schools which are often located in gentrifying neighborhoods, create multi-layers of
segregation based on race, socio-economic status, and parental education which furthers racial
and class stratification (Wells, et al., 2019). This system of manufactured diversity “drives a
process of segregation and exclusion of students based on familial advantage that is highly subtle
and complex, and thus not easily addressed in federal courts” (Wells, et al., 2019, p. 472).
Aside from further segregation based on student race and economic status, Minow (2011)
also argues that as school choice options increase it could create situations where schools are
separated by ethnicity, language, gender, disability, or other traits like sexual orientation. For
example, in New York City, LGBTQ students have the option of attending Harvey Milk High
School, and in Chicago African Americans can choose to attend the Betty Shabazz International
Charter school designed to celebrate African American culture and contributions to history
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(Minow, 2011). In areas of the country with high concentrations of ethnic students, charter
options include thematic programs designed to appeal to the student’s cultural heritage. Many of
these heritage schools are divided along racial lines to appeal to certain demographic groups
(Minow, 2011). Other special identity schools included schools specifically designed for students
with disabilities such as autism. Minow (2011) suggests that these types of special identity
schools could lead to self-separation leading to less diversity in public and private schools.
Summary
Minow (2011) maintains that there are at least three main concerns with school choice
options. First, many parents are unaware of how to navigate the school choice process. Parents of
higher socio-economic students or parents with greater levels of education often have more
resources to navigate the myriad of options available to students. These parents often secure
coveted spots in the more desirable schools of choice leaving out the most disadvantaged
students (Minow, 2011). Second, diverse integration across all demographics is diminished as
school choice may encourage separation based on identity politics or some other form of
demographics. Last, the rhetoric surrounding private school choice is unappealing to the general
public which often leads to misinformation about the various types of options available to
parents and students. Minow (2011) states that more choice may actually lead to less diversity
and may enable new forms of segregation based on personal aspirations, cultural and
demographic characteristics, and identity politics. Consequently, based on Minow’s analysis,
aside from offering more school choice, the decision in Espinoza may create a slew of additional
concerns for parents and education policy makers.33
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Part II: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020)
In Espinoza v. Montana (2020), the United States Supreme Court held that a state may
not exclude families and schools from participating in a student-aid program because of a
school's religious status.34 Previously, in San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), the
United States Supreme Court held that the right to an education is not a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution.35 However, the plaintiffs in Espinoza asked the Court to
recognize an analogous right to fund private religious education arguing that the state infringed
upon the petitioners right when the state barred private religious schools from participating in a
tax credit program generally available to other types of schools.36 The Supreme Court’s ruling is
significant because it signaled its support to end state practices that denied generally available
state funds to faith-based organizations (Russo & Thro, 2021).
Senate Bill 410
On May 8, 2015, the Montana legislature passed Senate Bill 410 which authorized
income tax credits for donations to Student Scholarship Organizations (SSO).37 SSOs provide
scholarships for students to attend a private school of choice. The Montana Department of
Revenue, which was tasked with implementing the program, implemented Rule 1 in accordance
with the Montana State’s Constitution “no aid” provision, prohibiting SSOs from distributing the
money to religiously affiliated schools.38 The Montana State Constitution’s “no aid” provision is
known as a Blaine Amendment. Blaine Amendments are named after a failed 1875 proposed
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United States constitutional amendment barring aid to sectarian schools. After the amendment
failed at the federal level, many states implemented their own version of the bill into their state
constitutions. Montana’s Blaine Amendment reads as follows:
The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not
make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or
any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church,
school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution,
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.39
Blaine amendments raise controversy because they grew out of a period of anti-Catholic bigotry,
and they severely limit or prohibit the distribution of state-based aid to religious institutions –
including schools (Russo, et al., 2020).
The Montana tax credit scholarship program established by SB 410 allowed individuals
and businesses to claim a tax credit up to $150 against their state income tax for their donation to
an SSO.40 The bill provided that neither the donor nor the SSO could restrict the use of the
scholarship to a particular private school or categories of private schools (Berg and Laycock,
2020). It was entirely up to the parents or guardian to decide which school their student attended.
Once SB 410 was passed, Big Sky Scholarships, the only SSO formed in the state, began to
provided donations to low-income students to attend a private school of their choice, including
private religious-based schools.41 The Montana Department of Revenue, however, stepped in and
prohibited the distribution of funds to religiously affiliated schools.42
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As a consequence of the Montana Department of Revenues enforcement of Rule 1,
Kendra Espinoza and two other litigants whose children attended a religious school sued the
department for excluding the Christian school their children attended from participating in the
program.43 The plaintiffs argued that the rule was unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of
the United Sates Constitution’s First Amendment and a violation of the Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.44 The plaintiffs argued that Rule 1 discriminated against them
based on their religious views.45 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that since the funds reached
the religious private school due to parental school choice, the tax credit scholarship program did
not violate either Religion Clauses.46 The Montana Department of Revenue in defense argued
that Rule 1 was required by Article X, § 6 of the Montana Constitution since most of the private
schools in Montana were religious based schools. According to the department, allowing
religious based schools to participate in the program would benefit religious institutions which
directly violates both the Montana State Constitutions “no aid” clause and the Religion Clauses
found in the First Amendment of the United States’ Constitution.47
Religion Clauses. The First Amendment contains two provisions concerning religion. It
states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof...”.48 The Establishment Clause forbids the federal government from
establishing an official state religion, and the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the state from
interference with religious beliefs. Since Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York
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(1970), the Court has acknowledged that there is “play in the joints” – or tension between the
two clauses. Chief Justice Burger, who authored the majority opinion, wrote:
We will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or government
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed government acts, there is
ample room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.49
According to Lindberg (2021), under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence school choice
programs that allow participants to choose a private religious based school to attend does not
violate the Establishment Clause if “the program is ‘neutral’ with respect to religion or if aid
goes to a religious school based only on parental choice” (p. 217). Furthermore, the plaintiffs
argued that the state of Montana violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied generally
available funds to individuals or groups solely based on their religious affiliation.50
Trial Court Decision. Initially, the plaintiffs filed suit in Montana state court challenging
the Montana Department of Revenues decision to enact Rule I.51 In March 2016, the Montana
Eleventh Judiciary District Court upheld the constitutionality of the tax credit program and
issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Rule 1 from going into effect. In his order, Judge
David Ortley stated, “The legislature’s stated purpose in enacting the tax credit program is to
provide parental and student choice in education…Rule 1 interjects qualifiers…that were not
included by the Legislature in the plain language of Mont. Code Ann § 15-30-3101.”52 The trial
court reasoned that the tax credit program did not appropriate money in violation of Montana’s
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“no-aid” provision and reinstated religious private school programs as potential recipients of tax
credit scholarship money.53
Montana Supreme Court Decision. The Montana Department of Revenue appealed the
trial court’s decision to the Montana Supreme Court in August 2017.54 Based on standard of
review, the Montana Supreme Court exercises plenary review over constitutional issues. The
Montana Supreme Court determined that even though the Montana’s state constitutions “no aid”
clause was more stringent than that of the United States Constitution’s First Amendment
Religion Clauses it did not violate the United States Constitution. Based on this determination,
the Montana Supreme Court concluded that the only issue in the case was whether the tax credit
scholarship program violated Montana’s “no aid” provision.55 The Montana Supreme Court
addressed the issue on three fronts. First, the court reviewed the intentions of the 1972
Constitutional Convention delegates and concluded that the delegates intent was to exclude
sectarian schools from receiving public funds.56 Second, the court determined that the tax credit
scholarship was unconstitutional because it indirectly funded sectarian schools in direct violation
of Article X, § 6. Last, the court determined that the Montana Department of Revenue had no
authority to implement Rule 1 in the first place – making it obsolete.57 Based on these findings
the Montana Supreme Court determined that the tax credit scholarship program was
unconstitutional because it violated Article X, § 6 of Montana’s Constitution.58
The Montana Supreme Court majority decided that the Montana Tax Credit Program
exceeded the “play in the joints” and violated both Religion Clauses. The court determined that it
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violated the Establishment Clause because it denied taxpayers the opportunity to choose whether
their funds should be used to support a religious school.59 In addition, the court concluded that
the program violated the Free Exercise Clause because taxpayers were forced to support
religious schools to receive the tax credit. As a result of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision
which invalidated the tax scholarship program as unconstitutional, Espinoza and the other two
women appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court which granted the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari on June 28, 2019.60
United States Supreme Court Decision
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the Montana
Supreme Court violated their Free Exercise Rights and Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection.61 Specifically, the petitioners argued that the program, and Rule 1, discriminated
against them based on their religious views. Furthermore, the petitioners pointed to the history of
Montana’s “no aid” clause and asserted that the clause violated their right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision agreed
with the plaintiffs.62 In determining its decisions, the United States Supreme Court referenced the
following caselaw as relevant to its ruling.
Everson v. Board of Education (1947). The 1947 foundational case, Everson v. Board
of Education (1947) considered the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that reimbursed
parents for bus fare to send their children to school, including students who attended private
religious schools.63 This case challenged the child benefit doctrine that held that certain types of
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indirect state aid could flow from the state to parochial schools as long as the aid directly
benefited the child and not the school.64 The Court noted a tension between the two Religion
Clauses but ultimately ruled that the use of public funds to provide transportation for students
attending parochial schools was not a violation of the Religion Clauses (McCartney, 2021).
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion in which he stated:
In recent years, so far as the provision against the establishment of a religion is
concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in connection with proposed state aid
to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public schools in
accordance with the tenets of a particular sect. Some churches have either sought or
accepted state financial support for their schools. Here again the efforts to obtain state aid
or acceptance of it have not been limited to any one particular faith. The state courts, in
the main, have remained faithful to the language of their own constitutional provisions
designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religious and governments. Their
decisions, however, show the difficulty in drawing the line between tax legislation which
provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that which is designed to support
institutions which teach religion.65
The Court in this ruling formulated the distinction between aid that benefits the child and aid that
benefits the institution – the backbone of the argument of current proponents of state funded
school vouchers (Geier, 2020).
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) is a landmark
case in which the Court ruled that publicly funded school vouchers are not a violation of the
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Establishment Clause provided certain conditions are met.66 This case involved the Ohio voucher
program which came under scrutiny because the program allowed parents whose students
attended low performing schools to use vouchers to attend private sectarian schools. The Court
focused on the question of whether the program as it was implemented in Ohio forced parents
into sending their children to sectarian schools.67 The Court concluded that the Ohio program did
not violate the Establishment Clause because parents were the ones who made the decision as to
where to spend the money (Geier, 2020). The Justices ruled that the program was consistent with
previous cases, particularly Mueller v. Allen (1983),68 Witters v. Washington (1986),69 and
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist. (1993),70 and, thus, was neutral in respect to religion.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government aid program is
neutral with respect to religion and provides assistance directly to a broad class of
citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their
own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits
government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of
numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the
perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual
recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.71
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The Court argued that if “the circuit” between government and religion was severed, there was
no violation against the Establishment Clause (Mead & Lewis, 2016). Consequently, the Zelman
case opened the doors to school voucher programs and other like programs across the country
leading to additional questions regarding the extent to which states are required to offer voucher
programs.72 This case affirmed that states could offer school voucher programs that included
religious schools, but it did not address whether states were compelled to provide generally
available funds to religious institutions.73
Locke v. Davey (2004). Joshua Davey, a Washington state Promise Scholarship recipient
who wanted to pursue a double major in pastoral ministries and business at a non-secular school,
challenged the states exclusion of a Theology major from its state-aid scholarship program.
While Zelman v. Harris-Simmons (2002)74 and other cases like it prior to Locke v. Davey
(2004)75 were specific to the establishment clause, this case invoked issues related to the Free
Exercise Clause. At issue was the section of the state’s constitution Blaine Amendment which
prohibited public funding for religious activities.76 The question at hand was if a state provides
college scholarships for secular instruction, does the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause
require a state to fund religious instruction?77 The Court recognized that the Washington states’
constitution took a stronger stance on the Religion Clauses than the U.S. Constitution and argued
that there was “play in the joints” between the two clauses.78 Likewise, the Court even went
further and determined that the Washington constitution did not violate the Free Exercise Clause,

72

Zelman v. Harris-Simmons, 536 U.S. ___ (2002).
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
75
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 724 (2004). Hereinafter this case will be referred to in the text as Locke v.
Davey (2004) or Davey.
76
Washington Constitution, Art. I, §11.
77
Locke v. Davey (2004).
78
Ibid.
73

40

thus, disappointing some proponents of school choice who hoped the Court would take aim at
state Blaine Amendments which they viewed as barriers to parochial school access to publicly
funded dollars (Geier, 2020). Chief Justice Rehnquist argued:
In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, §11 of the Washington
Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that
suggests animus towards religion. Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue,
we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious
instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.79
Chief Justice Rehnquist further summed up the Courts opinion by writing that, “Since the
founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to
support church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an ‘established religion’”80
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer (2017). In Trinity Lutheran
Church v. Comer (2017) the Court ruled that the Missouri Department of Natural Resources
violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied a non-secular preschool affiliated with Trinity
Lutheran Church a grant to resurface its playground with safer materials.81 Like Locke v. Davey
(2004), the state had invoked its Blaine Amendment which in part stated that, “no money shall
ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or
denomination of religion.”82 Once denied the grant based on its religious affiliation, the church
challenged the decision alleging discrimination based on religious.83 Ultimately, in a 7-2 decision
the Court ruled in favor of the church holding that religious entities cannot be denied generally
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available funds.84 Recognizing the impact the decision had on the Free Exercise Clause and state
Blaine Amendments, Justice Sotomayor wrote:
To hear the Court tell it, this is a simple case about recycling tires to resurface a
playground. The stakes are higher. This case is about nothing less than the relationship
between religious institutions and the civil government—that is, between church and
state. The Court today profoundly changes that relationship by holding, for the first time,
that the Constitution requires the government to provide public funds directly to a church.
Its decision slights both our precedents and our history, and its reasoning weakens this
country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial to
both.85
Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017) brought into question not only the constitutionality of
Missouri’s Blaine Amendment, but the constitutionality of all states with Blaine Amendments
(Geier, 2020). The Court’s decision seemed to uphold the Locke v. Davey (2004) decision in that
funds used specifically for religious purposes could be denied to religious beneficiaries but
denying generally available state-aid based funds to a religious entity simply because of religious
status was indeed a violation of the Free Exercise Clause (McCartney 2021). This argument was
at the crux of the petitioner’s argument in Espinoza.
Espinoza v. Montana (2020). In Espinoza v. Montana (2020) the Court held in favor of
the petitioners in a 5-4 decision.86 The majority Court relied most extensively on Trinity
Lutheran (2017) as evidenced through the multiple citations to the case. The majority framed the
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opinion in terms of the Free Exercise Clause as opposed to the Establishment Clause citing
issues related to religious status versus religious use. The majority concluded that Montana’s “no
aid” rule excluded religious schools from the tax credit program solely because of religious
status, and as such, the law was subject to strict scrutiny.87 Chief Justice Roberts writing for the
majority wrote, “It is enough in this case to conclude that strict scrutiny applies under Trinity
Lutheran because Montana’s no-aid provision discriminates based on religious status.”88. Chief
Justice Roberts went on to declare that “When otherwise eligible recipients are disqualified from
a public benefit ‘solely because of religious character,’ we must apply strict scrutiny.”89
Aside from addressing issues related to Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017), Chief Justice
Roberts also addressed concerns related to Davey v. Locke (2004). Chief Justice Roberts argued
that unlike the plaintiffs in Espinoza, Davey was not denied a scholarship because he wished to
attend a private religious based school, he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed
to do with it, i.e., become a minister.90 Apart from denying Davey a scholarship to pursue the
ministry, the program at issue in Davey v. Locke (2004) otherwise allowed scholarships to be
used at private religious schools. Chief Justice Robert writes,
By contrast, Montana’s Constitution does not zero in on any particular ‘essentially
religious’ course of instruction at a religious school. Rather, as we have explained, the
no-aid provision bars all aid to a religious school “simply because of what it is,” putting
the school to a choice between being religious or receiving government benefits.91
Roberts pointed out that Montana’s “no aid” provision penalized families that wish to send their
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child to a private religious school by cutting them off from generally available benefits simply
because of religious status.92 Roberts sums up the majority argument by writing “A state need
not subsidize private education. But once a state decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some
private schools solely because they are religious.”93
Aside from the majority opinion and the three concurring opinions, four justices
dissented. In writing the minority opinion, Ginsburg joined by Kagan argued that since the
Montana Supreme Court had struck down the Montana Tax Credit Program, the state could not
have discriminated against the plaintiffs because it made all schools and individuals ineligible for
the benefit.94 Justice Breyer in his own dissenting opinion rebuked the majority opinion by
arguing that the majority ignored the Establishment Clause precedent and should have further
considered the “play in the joints” between the two Religion.95 Justice Sotomayor in her own
dissenting opinion similar to Ginsburg, argued that since the Montana Supreme Court invalidated
the tax credit program the petitioners did not have grounds to bring the case before the United
States Supreme court. Furthermore, Sotomayor writes, “Not only is the Court wrong to decide
this case at all, it decides it wrongly.”96 She goes on to argue that the majority decision weakens
the country’s long tradition of separation of church and state.97
Summary
As outlined above, Espinoza concerned the funding of private religious based schools by
way of tax credit scholarships.98 Plaintiffs in the case argued that they were discriminated against
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and denied general available funds because of their religious status. Based on recent decisions, it
seems that the sentiment of the current Supreme Court Justices is to reduce the limits placed on
public funds available to religious institutions as witnessed by the Courts most recent ruling in
Espinoza. The Courts recent jurisprudence in Espinoza has two major implications: 1) the
upholding may require states to allow religiously based schools to participate in school choice
programs, including publicly funded voucher programs, and 2) the decision impacts the Religion
Clauses by expanding the scope of the Free Exercise Clause and minimizing state’s authority
under the Establishment Clause by restricting states from denying aid based on religious
associations (Russo, Thro, & Osborne, 2020).
Part III: Frame Analysis
Frame analysis is a multidisciplinary social science research method used to study social
constructions of reality and is often applied in the areas of communication, psychology, political
science, and other fields in the social sciences (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Frame analysis focuses on
how the media, political actors, and organizations represent topics by drawing attention to
specific issues often at the expense of others. It also focuses on how elite individuals and
organizations exert influence on public opinion and help shape the general perception of the
topic at hand. The major assumption behind frame analysis is that an issue can be thought of
from several perceptions and people’s conceptualization of that issue can be altered based on
how it is framed. Framing comprises one of the most important concepts in the study of public
policy and opinion shaping, yet it is not without controversy. Scholars have debated the exact
meaning of frame analysis, and some have referred to it as a “fractured paradigm” (Entman,
1993, p. 51). This section will explore the two prominent types of frame analysis (emphasis and
equivalency framing), and how these types are used in policy analysis and political sciences.
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What is Meant by the Term Frame Analysis?
Frame analysis has been applied to a whole range of topics and is used by virtually any
individual, group or organization who wishes to push a certain agenda. Political interest groups,
for example, frame issues in a way that will advance their position. Two major camps have
emerged in the area of frame analysis: the emphasis framing and the equivalency framing camps.
Entman (1993), whose works represent the emphasis framing camp, argues that framing includes
any effort to influence public opinion through the formulation of messages. In contrast to
Entman (1993), Iyengar (2009) limits the definition of frame analysis to presenting the same
information in different ways and suggests that it is the equivalency between arguments that
makes frame analysis relevant as a framework.
Erving Goffman first introduced the concept of framing in 1974. Goffman drew upon the
works of linguist Gregory Bateson (1972) who argues that statements by themselves do not have
any intrinsic meaning but are only acquired in a frame that is an outcome of how the individual
contextualizes words or phrases. Bateson defined frames as a “spatial and temporary bounding
set of interactive messages” that operate as a form of metacommunication (Bateson, 1972,
p.127). Frames are essentially abstractions that help the audience structure and organize
meaning. Goffman (1974) builds on Bateson’s theory by introducing the concept of “primary
framework” or interpretive schemas to classify and interpret information (Goffman, 1974, p. 24).
Primary frameworks operate at both the macro and micro levels – at the macrolevel
communicators present information in such a way that their audience is able to integrate complex
information into existing schemas (Scheufele &Tewksbury, 2007). At the microlevel it describes
how people use information to form impressions in everyday life.
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While Goffman (1974) is often considered the father of frame analysis other scholars
have built on Goffman’s work across all social science fields. Gamson and Modigliani (1989),
both sociologists, describe frames as “interpretive packages” (p. 2). The “interpretive package”
includes central organizing ideas referred to as frames and symbols condensed into small strips
of information designed to tell a story (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989, p. 2). Iyengar (1994), a
political scientist, on the other hand describes the process in terms of frame effects. Iyengar
(1994) maintains that frames are slight changes in the way the information is presented so as to
led individuals to believe they have a choice. Iyengar’s (1994) conceptualization is similar to
research conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1984), both psychologists, whose prospect
theory used framing as way to describe subtle differences in choice alternatives. In their
experiments Kahneman and Tversky (1984) provided their subjects with two choices that were
identical in outcome, but in one scenario they used positive word choices to describe the
outcome and in the other scenario they used negative word choices. This study demonstrated that
even though the outcomes in both scenarios were identical, people make choices based on how
the question is framed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Iyengar’s (2009) decades long research
supports Kahneman and Tversky’s analysis leading him to call upon others in the field to turn
away from the emphasis framing camp in support of the equivalency framing camp in hopes of
developing “a more powerful theoretical framework for understanding the conditions under
which framing effects do or do not occur” (p. 190).
Whereas equivalency frames emphasis small subtle differences that led individuals to
believe they have choices, emphasis framing emphasizes specific aspects of an issue that
encourages certain interpretations of the meaningful context and discourages other aspects
(Druckman, 2001). Entman (1993) in his controversial paper, Framing: Toward Clarification of
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a Fractured Paradigm, in which he argued for a single paradigm for framing research, suggested
that emphasis frames, also called issue frames, provide a broader understanding of frame
analysis because the approach’s focus is on salient points presented by a speaker or in a text
which emphasizes a subset of ideas or viewpoints the speaker or author wants to convey. By
focusing on these salient points, the individuals are led to construct opinions based on the points
the speaker or author highlights. Druckman (2004) provides an example in which he describes a
situation where a group may be asked to think about a hate group rally in terms of free speech as
opposed to a public safety concern. How the question is framed will determine which salient
points individuals focus on when framing thoughts on the issue. Entman (1993) states that,
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or
treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)
Borah (2011) described the debate between the two existing frame paradigms as frames
living a “double life” (p. 257). Borah notes that the many disciplines that utilize frame analysis
makes it difficult to nail down a specific paradigm that encompasses all framing research (Borah,
2011). Borah, however, unlike Iyengar (2009, 2011), argues for a more inclusive approach to
framing research that embraces studies that examine specific framing issues or effects in such a
manner that the research facilitates the development of a comprehensive theory without stifling
the many definitions and methodologies used across the social science fields (Borah, 2011).
In 2012, de Vreese reviewed a serious of articles that specifically evaluated the findings
from a project where the starting position was that frame analysis is a process in need of an
integrated research approach (de Vreese, 2012). de Vreese (2012) maintained like Entman (1993)
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that maintaining a broad and inclusive definition of frames in the initial stage of a research
paradigm is preferred. He concludes his analysis with the assumption that a more general
definition of frame analysis is necessary to allow cross-disciplinary studies and studies do need
to clarify the conceptual status and the core assumptions of their framing research (de Vreese,
2012).
Agenda Setting, Priming, and Framing
Frame analysis cannot be addressed thoroughly without some discussion of the
differences between agenda setting, priming, and framing. Framing is often equated with agenda
setting and priming. Whereas framing involves the process of shaping the publics general
attitude towards an issue, agenda setting is the process of bringing attention to an issue and is
considered the first stage of the policy process. Research shows that the average citizen is not an
active participant in the political process and is unaware of many of the issues shaping public
policy (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Sabatier (2014) argues that before a policy issue can be
brought before the government for solution policy elites must identify issues and bring them to
the public’s attention. There are multiple actors from government and non-government groups
involved in this process and include the media, legislatures at different levels of government, as
well as judges and court systems (Sabatier, 2014). These policy actors, politicians, elites,
organizations, and other interest groups all try to control and shape public policy to achieve
favorable policy outcomes to their political interest (Sabatier, 2014). This process is a struggle
over whose political, social, or economic message will prevail (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).
Priming, on the other hand, is an extension of the agenda-setting process. Priming usually
occurs after an issue has entered the agenda-setting stage and elite groups work to make the issue
salient in the general public’s mind (Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014). Priming has its roots in
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psychology where it is believed that information is stored in memory nodes. Each node
corresponds to a concept that when activated cause the individual to recall information about the
topic that is then associated with how the topic is being presented. With repeat exposure to a
topic or idea the individual will begin to associate it with the larger agenda issue presented by
policy elites (Moy & Tewskbury, 2016). Ultimately, by making the issue more salient in
people’s minds, policy elites can begin the process of shaping how the mass public or audience
thinks about the issue. The success of priming is determined by how knowledgeable or involved
the target audience is in relation to the topic at hand.
Framing is generally influenced by the media, political actors, and/or policy elites
(Hanggli, 2012). Frames help policy elites simplify ideas or concepts in such a manner that the
audience can make sense of it. A frame is a way of communicating ordinary everyday ideas to
the audience and is typically associate with one specific issue or topic. Framing undergoes two
stages of process: 1) frame building and 2) frame setting (Moy, et al., 2016). Frame-building is
the process policy elites use to make everyday connections to events and is directly influenced
by culture and social norms. Frame advocates will use social and cultural norms to develop
frames for public consumption (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2020). Frames from opposing
advocates compete for audience attention. Frame-setting explains the effect the frame has on the
audiences’ beliefs and can influence public behavior (Moy, et al., 2016). According to Moy, et
al. (2016), “The basic idea with frame-setting is that people have perceptions about public issues
and problems. These perceptions comprise beliefs about the causes and consequences of
problems and about who is responsible for correcting them” (p. 9). Consequently, frames help
shape public policy by the influence they exert over the target audience.
In sum, frame analysis is a multi-disciplinary social science research method used to
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understand how policy elites frame issues relevant to their cause and use them to exploit and
manipulate the public or targeted audience to support their unique view or perspective on a topic.
Frame analysis is used in communication studies, political science, psychology, sociology, and
other social sciences. As a methodology, research scholars look for themes that exist within news
sources or in written text, and then determine how those themes are framed to influence the
targeted audience. Although there is much debate about whether frame analysis should be
narrowed to nail down one specific paradigm, it continues to flourish and prove itself a useful
tool for understanding how interest groups and policy actors influence the direction of public
policy.
Interest Groups Use of Frame Analysis
Organized interest groups use framing strategies to engage with the public, the media,
and policymakers (Moyer, 2021). The interest group’s ability to convince others to support their
policy-agendas is often determined by their ability to frame an issue in a way that is salient with
the targeted audience. Most research on interest group and framing centers around influencing
the public, legislators at the state and local level, or other policymakers through the media. Very
little focus has been placed on the courts, yet interest groups spend a tremendous amount of time
and money lobbying the courts by way of amicus curiae briefs. According to Collins, et al.
(2015) most of the research utilizing amicus briefs focus on the political leanings of the courts or
the outcome of the judges’ votes. Very little research investigates the actual arguments raised in
amicus briefs or evaluates the frames or themes used by amici curiae.
Interest groups file amicus briefs in hopes of influencing the legal decisions made by
judges and by extension the policy decisions that may result. Although little research has been
conducted to determine if a particular court ruling is the direct result of an amicus brief, there is
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ample evidence that interest group lobbying of the courts does have some effect on the court’s
decision (Collins & Solowiej, 2007). The actual effect, however, is limited by several factors
which include salience of the case, prestige and experience of the amicus involved in the case,
the quality of the brief, and whether the brief is a “me too” brief and does nothing more than
repeat the arguments of the main litigants and adds nothing new to the case (Collins, et al., 2014,
p. 229). Other research has been conducted to determine if judges’ ideological orientation
influences their reception of amicus briefs filed by interest groups with opposing ideologies.
Pacelle, et al. (2018) suggests that more conservative judges “tend to view the presence of
powerful amicus groups as a signal to vote against the party that group supports – and at the
same time, liberal justices are more likely to vote conservatively in cases involving a powerful
conservative amicus” (p. 1255). Collins (2008) supports this claim and suggests that amicus
briefs filed by interest groups may reinforce a judge’s predisposition towards an issue.
Do Interest Groups Serve as Framers of Policy?
Epstein (1992) noted in her seminal book Supreme Court and Legal Change: Abortion
and the Death Penalty, that the Court in the last part of the twentieth century made significant
policy decisions typically reserved for the elected branches of government. The Court has made
landmark decisions on school prayer, racial segregation, gay rights, and now, decisions that may
affect school choice as it relates to state-based aid to religious institutions.
In essence, Epstein (1992) argues that the United States Supreme Court is not a neutral
place where court cases are devoid of politics. Amici curiae representing partisan interest groups
by way of amicus briefs attempt to influence justices’ decisions on major cases that have
ramifications for public policy (Epstein, 1992). It can be advanced that how amici curiae frame
issues may influence the outcome of the Court’s decision, thereby advancing policy making.
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Frame Analysis as a Conceptual Lens
Frame analysis, as described by D’Angelo and Kuypers (2009), is an amalgamation of
concepts, approaches, and multiparadigmatic research methodologies. Entman (2007) describes
framing as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative
that highlights the connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (p. 164).
Terkildsen and Schnell (1997) suggest that “framing is important whenever an issue can be
presented in multiple ways which may potentially influence how people think about an issue” (p.
881). Ultimately, frame analysis asserts that people respond to issues based on the way issues are
framed. Different framing may elicit a different response (Druckman, 2001). For example,
suggesting that school tax credit scholarships promote opportunity will elicit a different response
than suggesting that school tax credit scholarships undermine neighborhood public schools.
Based on how the tools of school choice are framed may make people support an issue they may
otherwise oppose, and vice versa (Brewer and Gross, 2005).
Neuman et al. (1992) in their influential study on the construction of political meaning
identified several frames covering a range of issues that include powerlessness, conflict,
economic consequences, human impact, and morality frames. In the early 1990s, these frames
were used to analyze newspaper articles or television news stories in the United States. In a later
study Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) expanded on Neuman, et al. (1992) study and revised the
frames to include conflict, attribution of responsibility, morality, economic consequences, and
human interest as a lens to analyze a variety of text related to topics such as climate change,
autism, car crashes, and issues related to educational equity (Aman, et al., 2020; Dirikx &
Gelders, 2010; Grooms, 2019; Luther & Zhou, 2005; Muhamad &Yang, 2017). Semetko and
Valkenburg’s (2000) study demonstrated how the five generic frames could be utilized for
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research outside of the news media field. These five frames are further explained in Chapter 3.
Conclusion
The aim of this qualitative content analysis is to identify the dominant policy frames
interest groups used to frame policy preferences in Espinoza. An additional goal is to determine
which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerge in the written opinions of the
justices in Espinoza. This study will examine the process through the theoretical lens of frame
analysis using Semetko and Valkenburg’s generic frames as a priori codes. Frame analysis is a
theoretical process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient
their thinking about an issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Frame analysis suggests that how
something is presented to the audience (called “the frame”) influences the choices people make
about how to process information. Goffman (1974), who first coined the term maintains that
frames help audiences “locate, perceive, identify, and label the flow of information” (p.21).
Drucker and Chong (2007) expanded on Goffman’s theory to incorporate framing effects, which
they define as “a means by which politicians attempt to mobilize voters behind their policies by
encouraging them to think about policies along a particular line” (p. 106).
In this chapter, I provided a summary of the history of the school choice movement
through the lens of Minow’s (2022) school choice framework. I also described the events leading
up to Espinoza and traced the trajectory of the case as it made its way to the United States
Supreme Court. I also discussed the Religion Clauses as they relate to Espinoza. In addition, in
this section I reviewed the extant literature that focuses on how interest groups influence the
courts through the amicus brief process. I closed this chapter with an exploration of the literature
related to frame analysis and discussed how this theory will serve as my conceptual lens. In the
next chapter, I described the methodological approach that I used to analyze the amicus briefs in
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the Espinoza. I explained how I planned to evaluate the text of the briefs for dominant frames
and emerging themes using Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames, and how I
extrapolated that information and compared it to the frames that emerge in the justices’ written
opinions.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this qualitative content analysis was to identify the dominant policy
frames interest groups used in their amicus briefs to frame policy preferences in the United
States Supreme Court case Espinoza v. Montana (2020).99 A second goal was to determine which
(if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerged in the written opinions of the justices.
This study may help education policy researchers develop a better understanding of how
different policy frames chosen by interest groups to frame policy preferences may (or may not)
influence the Courts’ opinion, and ultimately education policy and law. A caveat to this study,
however, is that these results cannot be generalized to other Supreme Court cases outside this
study. This study is guided by the following two research questions:
RQ1. What dominant policy frames do interest groups use to frame policy preferences
in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)?
RQ2. Which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerge in the written
opinions of the United States Supreme Court justices in Espinoza v. Montana
(2020)?
Research Design
To identify the policy frames used by interest groups, this study consisted of a qualitative
content analysis of the amicus briefs and the written opinions of the justices in Espinoza v.
Montana (2020).100 My unit of analysis was a purposeful selection of 18 out of 45 amicus briefs
filed by interest groups and the opinions rendered by the Supreme Court justices. The purposeful
selection for this study did not include recordings of oral arguments, petition for writ of
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Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
Ibid.
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certiorari, motions, blanket consents, appendices, or any other material produced by the case.
According to Krippendorff (2013), “content analysis is a research technique for making
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their
use” (p. 24). Krippendorff (2013) contends that all reading of text is qualitative even when
certain characteristics are later converted into numbers – or quantified. Qualitative content
analysis involves the examination of text, which can include magazines, newspapers, speeches,
books, or even pictures (Krippendorff, 2013). Qualitative content analysis can either be
deductive or inductive. Deductive content analysis is used when the researcher chooses a priori
codes that guides the researcher’s collection and analysis of data (Mayring, 2000). Inductive
content analysis is data driven by researchers who immerses themselves into the data by reading
the text and identifying themes that are broken into categories that are then applied to the set of
data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For this study, I chose to utilize both deductive and inductive
methodologies as shown in Figure 1 for two reasons:
1. Deductive analysis helps the researcher sort data into organizational categories to
maintain alignment with research questions.
2. Inductive analysis helps the researcher make meaning from the data and develop
emerging codes and themes.
Utilizing both deductive and inductive analysis processes support a more organized, rigorous,
and analytically sound qualitative content analysis study (Bingham & Witkowsky, 2021).
Bingham and Witkowsky (2021) contend that qualitative researchers must “focus on
organizational practices, including organizing the data type, keeping track of transcriptions, and
categorizing representative data excerpts while focusing on their research questions, coding
schemes, and emergent theories and concepts" (p. 134).
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Figure 1
Research Design of Study
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Purposeful Selection
In total, 45 amicus briefs were submitted in Espinoza. Amici curiae included a wide
range of think tanks, state coalitions, 131 current and former state legislators and governors, nonprofit organizations, teacher unions or affiliations, and religious organizations. Thirty-one
amicus briefs called for the reversal of the Montana Supreme Court’s decision and 14 briefs
called for the affirmation of the lower court’s decision as identified in Table 3.
In addition to the 45 amicus briefs, in total the Supreme Court justices wrote seven
opinions. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a
concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch. In addition, Justices Samuel Alito
and Gorsuch filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Kavanaugh signed on to the majority
opinion. Justices Ruth Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor filed three dissenting
opinions. Justice Elena Kagan joined with Ginsburg and Breyer.
Amicus Brief Selection Process
After initially immersing myself into the data, it became apparent that many of the
amicus briefs filed in Espinoza were “me too” briefs. “Me too” briefs are briefs that repeat the
same arguments contained in the litigant’s briefs without adding any new or novel information
(Collins, et al., 2014). According to Supreme Court Rule 37, amicus briefs should bring attention
to the Court relevant information not already brought to its attention by the parties in the case.
The Supreme Court Rule 37 states:
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already
brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An
amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not
favored (Rules of the Sup. Ct. R. 37, 2019).
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Table 3
Amicus Briefs Filed in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)
Filed by

Conclusion

Alliance for Choice in Education

Reverse

American Center for Law and Justice

Reverse

Americans for Prosperity and Yes. Every Kid.

Reverse

Arizona Christian School Tuition Org, et al.

Reverse

Billy Graham Evangelist Assoc. et al.

Reverse

Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence

Reverse

Center for Education Reform, et al.

Reverse

Christian Legal Society, et al.

Reverse

EdChoice, et al.

Reverse

Forge Youth Mentoring

Reverse

Foundation for Moral Law

Reverse

Georgia Goal Scholarship Program, Inc.

Reverse

Honorable Scotty Walker

Reverse

Independence Institute

Reverse

Jerry and Kathy Armstrong, et al.

Reverse

Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty

Reverse

Justice and Freedom Fund, et al.

Reverse

Liberty Justice Center and American Federation
for Children

Reverse

Mackinac Center for Public Policy

Reverse

Montana Catholic School Parents, et al.

Reverse

Montana Family Foundation

Reverse

State of Oklahoma, et al.

Reverse
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Table 3 cont.
Amicus Briefs Filed in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)
Filed by

Conclusion

Opportunity Scholarship Fund

Reverse

Pioneer Institute

Reverse

Rusty Bowers Speaker of Arizona House of Rep. et al.

Reverse

Sen. Steve Daines, et al.

Reverse

The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

Reverse

The Cato Institute

Reverse

The Rutherford Institute

Reverse

The United States (Solicitor General)

Reverse

131 Current and Former Legislators

Reverse

Am. Federation of Teachers, et al.

Affirm

Baptist Joint Committee, et al.

Affirm

States of Colorado, California, et al.

Affirm

Freedom from Religion Foundation, et al.

Affirm

Montana Const. Convention Delegates

Affirm

Montana Northern Wyoming Conference, et al.

Affirm

Montana Association of Rabbis

Affirm

National Disability Rights Network, et al.

Affirm

National School Boards Association, et al.

Affirm

Public Funds Public Schools

Affirm

Religion Law Scholars

Affirm

Religious and Civil Rights Organization, et al.

Affirm

State of Maine

Affirm

Tennessee Ed. Association

Affirm
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Aside from “me too” briefs, amicus briefs that lacked focus on the implications the
Court’s decision may have on a national level were also excluded. For example, the Brief of
Amicus Curia Forge Youth Mentoring in support of petitioners was submitted by a Washington
based local charitable organization. The Forge Charitable Organization fosters intergenerational
mentoring relationships among local youths and adults. The brief primarily focused on the
organization’s history and local roots. The amici emphasized a desire to receive generally
available funds to help support the organizations religious-based mission but do not advance an
argument that has implications on a national level. Other briefs addressed grievances of
individual states such as those briefs filed by the states of Maine and Oklahoma. However, since
this study was primarily concerned with how interest groups framed policy preferences, I
decided to narrow the scope of this research to include only those amicus briefs submitted by
interest groups not associated with a government entity. Amicus briefs that met all of the
following criteria were included in this study:
1. Added something new or novel to the discussion – not a “me too” brief.
2. Addressed the issues involved in the case on a national level – national scope.
3. Interest of amici curiae did not act on behalf of government – not a government entity
In total 18 amicus briefs met these criteria. The briefs represented a broad range of interest
groups from across the political spectrum. The chosen briefs included a variety of organizations
comprised of think tanks, non-profit organizations, teacher unions or affiliations, and religious
organizations. Amicus briefs that met the criteria are identified in Table 4.
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Table 4
Amicus Brief Selection Process
National Scope

Not a Government
Entity

Alliance for Choice in Education

X

X

American Center for Law and Justice

X

X

X

X

Filed By

Not a “Me Too” Brief

Americans for Prosperity and Yes. Every Kid.

X

Arizona Christian School Tuition Org, et al.

X

Billy Graham Evangelist Assoc. et al.

X

Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
Center for Education Reform, et al.

X

Christian Legal Society, et al.
EdChoice, et al.

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Forge Youth Mentoring

X

Foundation for Moral Law
Georgia Goal Scholarship Program, Inc.

X

X

X

X

X

Honorable Scotty Walker

X

Independence Institute

X

Jerry and Kathy Armstrong, et al.

X

Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty

X

Justice and Freedom Fund, et al.

X
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X

X
X

X

X

Table 4 cont.
Amicus Brief Selection Process
Filed By

Not a “Me Too” Brief

National Scope
X

Not a Government
Entity

Liberty Justice Center and American Federation
for Children

X

X

Mackinac Center for Public Policy

X

X

Montana Catholic School Parents, et al.

X

X
X

Montana Family Foundation
State of Oklahoma, et al.

X

Opportunity Scholarship Fund

X

X

Pioneer Institute

X

Rusty Bowers Speaker of Arizona House of Rep. et al.

X

Sen. Steve Daines, et al.

X

The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty

X

X

X

X

The Rutherford Institute

X

X

The United States (Solicitor General)

X

131 Current and Former Legislators

X

X

The Cato Institute
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X

Table 4 cont.
Amicus Brief Selection Process
Not a “Me Too” Brief

National Scope

Not a Government
Entity

Am. Federation of Teachers, et al.

X

X

X

Baptist Joint Committee, et al.

X

X

X

States of Colorado, California, et al.

X

X

Freedom from Religion Foundation, et al.

X

X

X

Montana Const. Convention Delegates

X

Montana Northern Wyoming Conference, et al.

X

X

X

Montana Association of Rabbis

X

X

X

National Disability Rights Network, et al.

X

X

X

National School Boards Association, et al.

X

X

X

Public Funds Public Schools

X

X

X

Filed By

Religion Law Scholars

X

Religious and Civil Rights Organization, et al.

X

X

X

X

State of Maine

X

Tennessee Ed. Association

X
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Rationale for Qualitative Content Analysis
As stated above, qualitative content analysis can utilize existing theory or predefined
codes or themes to guide a study (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). As discussed in Chapter 2, as part of
the deductive stage of this process, I used Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames as
my a priori codes to help guide the study. As I entered the inductive phase of this activity, I
immersed myself more fully into the data. Through an iterative process new themes emerged
based on the initial a priori codes. As an outcome of this process, I create a system of categories
that enabled me to reflect and refine new concepts and themes. To help organize my study during
this phase, I used NVivo, a qualitative data analysis computer-based software program, to help
organize, analyze, and code the data into dominant frames and thematic units (see Appendix A).
In accordance with Saldana (2009), this method of identifying codes and themes is appropriate
for a qualitative content analysis study because it allows the researcher to “identify what a unit of
data is about and/or what it means” (p. 199).
Procedures for Conducting a Qualitative Content Analysis
There is no single defining procedure to guide researchers through the qualitative content
analysis (QCA) process. However, several scholars have identified basic steps and procedures to
help guide novice researchers such as myself. Typically, these plans involve a minimum of three
phases, and some plans involve as many as eight steps (Elo and Kyngas, 2008; Elo, et al., 2014;
Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Kibiswa, 2019; Mayring, 2000; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). The three
phases as identified by Elo, et al. (2014) include a preparation phase, organization phase, and a
reporting phase. I used these three phases as a guide to conduct this qualitative content analysis
study. As I proceeded through the phases, I entered data into the NVivo software program to
facilitate the coding process.
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Phase One: Preparation Phase
According to Hsieh & Shannon (2005), deductive content analysis builds on existing
theory which can help focus the research question. Based on this premise, during the preparation
phase of my research, I immersed myself into the literature and identified a theory that was
conducive to my study. The theory I identified was based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000)
five generic frames. Multiple researchers have used these frames to analyze various text forms
for basic themes (Aman, et al., 2020; Dirikx & Gelders, 2010; Grooms, 2019; Luther & Zhou,
2005; Muhamad &Yang, 2017). I used these generic frames to develop my study’s analysis
matrix – or codebook. The codes are identified in Table 5 through Table 9, inclusive. The
codebook contains operational definitions that I continuously developed and refined throughout
the research process. Additional codes and themes were added as they emerged in the data.
Ultimately, I identified codes/themes that helped me make connections across the data set.
Once I developed the codebook, I began a process of familiarizing myself with the data.
To do this, I fully immersed myself into the amicus briefs and written opinions of the justices by
reading and re-reading the text until I had a comfortable command of the text contents. As I read,
I identified themes and sub-themes based on the a priori codes initially identified in the studies
codebook. During this process, I identified new subcategory codes and themes as they emerged
from the text. To aid in the coding process, I used NVivo software to help me organize the text
which allowed me to gather related material in one place so that I could more easily identify
emerging frames, ideas, and themes. I recorded notes in NVivo to track my thoughts and reflect
on my thinking which helped me maintain an audit trail of my research (see Appendix B). In
addition, I made annotations as I read each brief and opinion (see Appendix C).
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Table 5
A Priori Code: Conflict Frame
Code
Conflict
frame

Definition
This frame emphasizes
conflict between
individuals, groups, or
institutions. This code
applies to all references
to individuals, groups,
or institutions engaged
in conflict. Conflict is
defined as a clash of
interest and the basis
of the conflict may be
personal, religious,
racial, class, or political.

When to use

When not to use

Example Excerpt

Use this code when the coder
can affirm the following
questions:
• How does the text reflect
disagreement between
parties, individuals, or
groups?
• How does one party,
individual, or group
reproach another?
• How does the text refer to
two sides or to more than
two sides of the problem
or issue?

Do not use this code when
the coder cannot affirm at
least two of the when to
use questions to the text.

“Not only is the record
replete with discussion of
activities, uses, and
conduct, any jurisprudence
grounded on a status use
distinction seems destined
to yield more questions
than answers. Does
Montana seek to prevent
religious parents and
schools from participating
in a public benefits program
(status)? Or does the State
aim to bar public benefits
from being employed to
support religious education
(use).” 101

Note. Adapted from “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News” by Semetko, H. A., &
Valkenburg, P. M., 2000, Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93-109.
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Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2275 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

68

Table 6
A Priori Code: Attribution of Responsibility Frame
Code
Attribution of
responsibility
frame

Definition
This frame emphasizes
beliefs about the cause of an
event or outcome of a
situation. This frame
attributes responsibility or a
solution to a situation to
either the government,
individual, or group.

When to use
Use this code when the coder
can affirm at least one of the
following questions:
• Does the brief/opinion
suggest that some level of
government can alleviate
the problem?
• Does the brief/opinion
suggest that some level of
government is responsible
for the issue/problem?
• Does the brief/opinion
suggest solution(s) to the
problem/issue?
• Does the brief/opinion
suggest that an individual
or group is responsible for
the issue/problem?

When not to use

Example Excerpt

Do not use this code when
the coder cannot
affirm at least one of the
when to use questions to the
text.

“Rather than protecting
these students, the
Department would deny
them the option of
attending a religious
school. The Department’s
rule flips the
Establishment Clause on
its head. It uses the power
of the state to prohibit the
exercise of civil liberties.
Thus, the Department
finds itself portrayed as
the bouncer in the comic
on the next page, barring
the schoolhouse door to
low-income children by
relying on a state Blaine
Amendment.”102

Note. Adapted from “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News” by Semetko, H. A., &
Valkenburg, P. M., 2000, Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93-109.

Brief for the Liberty Justice Center and American Federation for Children as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5118, *16.
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Table 7
A Priori Code: Morality Frame
Code
Morality
frame

Definition
This frame puts the event,
problem, or issue in
context of religious tenets
or moral prescriptions. It
usually contains a moral
message or prescription
about how to behave.

When to use

When not to use

Example Excerpt

Use this code when the
coder can affirm at least
one of the following
questions:
• Does the text contain a
moral message?
• Does the text make a
reference to morality,
God, other religious
tenets or the
constitution?
• Does the text offer
specific social
prescriptions about
how to behave?

Do not use this code when
the coder cannot affirm at
least one of the when to
use questions to the text.

“This ‘equality principle’,
the theory goes, prohibits
the government from
expressing any preference
for religion—or even
permitting any signs of
religion in the
governmental realm...
This understanding of the
Establishment Clause is
unmoored from the
original meaning of the
First Amendment.”103

Note. Adapted from “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News” by Semetko, H. A., &
Valkenburg, P. M., 2000, Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93-109.
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Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Table 8
A Priori Code: Economic Consequences Frame
Code

Definition

When to use

When not to use

Example Excerpt

Economic
consequences
frame

This frame reports an
event, problem, or issue in
terms of the consequences
it will have economically
on an individual, groups,
or organizations.

Use this code when the
coder can affirm at least
one of the following
questions:
• Is there a mention of
(financial) losses or
gains now or in the
future?
• Is there a mention of
the costs/degree of
expense involved?
• Is there a reference to
(economic)
consequences of
pursuing or not
pursuing a course of
action?

Do not use this code when
the coder cannot affirm at
least one of the when to
use questions to the text.

“Although a private
education for her children
is a priority for Christi,
it’s not for her kids’
father. He refuses to
contribute to his
children’s tuition
expenses so Christi must
cover the tuition on her
own. Christi’s daughter
receives a merit
scholarship and both
children receive tuition
assistance through the
diocese and the Missoula
Catholic Schools
Fund.”104

Note. Adapted from “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News” by Semetko, H. A., &
Valkenburg, P. M., 2000, Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93-109.

Brief for Montanan Catholic School Parents, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246
(2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4598, *16.
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Table 9
A Priori Code: Human Interest Frame

Code
Human interest
frame

Definition
This frame brings a
human face or an
emotional angle to the
presentation of an event,
issue, or problem. It
presents people and their
problems, concerns, or
achievements in a way
that brings out empathy.

When to use

When not to use

Example Excerpt

Use this code when the coder can
affirm at least two of the following
questions:
• Does the text provide a human
example or “human face” on the
issue?
• Does the text employ adjectives
or personal vignettes that generate
feelings of outrage, empathy,
caring, sympathy, or compassion?
• Does the text emphasize how
individuals and groups are
affected by the issue/problem?
• Does the text go into the private
or personal lives of the actors?
• Does the text contain visual
information that might generate
feelings of outrage, empathy,
caring, sympathy, or compassion?

Do not use this code when
the coder cannot affirm at
least one of the when to
use questions to the text.

“Brittany Sukhbir’s
little girl Raelyn cried
every night after a day
at school. Raelyn
attended second grade
at the local public
school in Livingston,
and a classmate was
bullying her
unmercifully.”105

Note. Adapted from “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television News” by Semetko, H. A., &
Valkenburg, P. M., 2000, Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93-109.

Brief for Montanan Catholic School Parents, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246
(2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4598, *4.
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Once this part was completed, I produced a visual representation of the first back-and-forth
reading analyzing process, or what Saldana (2009) refers to as the first cycle of the coding
process. During this first cycle, I identified the texts dominant frames and emerging thematic
units.
Phase Two: Data Analysis
Phases two of this qualitative content analysis study involved a more intense level of data
coding and data analysis. In this phase of my research, which Saldana (2009) refers to as second
cycle of coding, I continued to analyze each individual brief and written opinion. I assigned
codes or subcodes identified in the codebook to thematic units which I recorded in NVivo. The
result of this process was a Reading Summary Form as shown in Table 10. This form was a
document I produced in Excel that was based on the information entered into NVivo. I organized
each brief and written opinion with the various codes, subcodes, and themes into this document
so that I could more easily identify the text’s attributes. I also created a Thematically Clustered
Matrix or what Elo and Kyngas (2008) call a categorization matrix. I organized the data from
multiple briefs and justices’ opinions into the Thematically Clustered Matrix so that I could
make comparisons across the briefs and written opinions (see Appendix D). Based on this cluster
of text, I identified sections of the individual briefs and written opinions that matched the
operational definitions identified in the code agenda.
After creating the Reading Summary Form, I made connections, interpreted the data, and
drew conclusions. I analyzed the data including disconfirming themes that challenged the
operational definitions identified in the codebook. In this phase I went beyond the obvious and
began to make meaning and inferences about the relationship between the briefs and written
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Table 10
Reading Summary Form
Amicus Brief/
Written Opinion

Filed

The Cato Institute
(Amicus brief)

Sept.17,
2019

Tennessee Education
Association
(Amicus brief)

Nov. 15,
2019

Conclusion
Reverse

Affirmed

Code

Example Excerpt

Morality frame

“The Free Exercise Clause protects
religious observers from unequal
treatment where that inequality is
based solely on a person or
organization’s religious status.”106

Human interest
frame

“The Court should also recognize
that school choice programs allow
parents to select schools that share
their values, reducing the need to
impose those values on others.”107

Economic
consequences
frame

“These types of programs divert
much needed tax dollars away from
the public schools and into the
hands of individuals to facilitate
their own education
consumption.”108

Human interest
frame

Justice Clarence
Thomas
(Written opinion)

June 30,
2020

Concurring

Human interest
frame

Justice Sonia
Sotomayor
(Written opinion)

June 30,
2020

Dissenting

Attribution of
responsibility
frame

“Elevating individual desires over
the public good, these programs
ultimately undermine the important
social and societal benefits of public
education.”109
“Until we correct course on that
interpretation, individuals will
continue to face needless obstacles
in their attempts to vindicate their
religious freedom.”110
“Today’s ruling is perverse.
Without any need or power to do so,
the Court appears to require a State
to reinstate a tax-credit program that
the Constitution did not demand in
the first place.”111

Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S.
Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4450, *4.
107 Ibid at 7.
108 Brief for the Tennessee Education Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t
of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6590, *3.
109 Ibid.
110 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
111 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2297 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
106
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opinions. I compared the dominant frames and themes that emerged in the briefs to the dominant
frames and themes that emerged in the written opinions of the justices. I used this information to
determine if a new subtheme should be considered an emerging frame and added to the original
codebook. As mentioned earlier, the qualitative content analysis process is a sequential,
systematic, and recursive process that requires coding and recoding data. Like Mayring (2000)
stated, it was an ongoing process that required me to reach saturation before concluding the end
of the analysis process. The goal in this phase was to uncover the manifest and/or latent content
and to make sense out of the data (Kibiswa, 2019).
Phase Three: Reporting the Analysis Process
During phase three of my research, I reported the final results of the study. I identified
the initial research plan and list of steps I followed to conduct the study from the beginning to the
end to ensure confirmability and dependability. Confirmability involves ensuring that data
interpretation is grounded in the data and not based on the researchers’ subjective view
(Korstjens & Moser, 2018). Dependability involves ensuring that the records of the research path
are maintained throughout the process of the study and that the study follows the standard
practices of a particular design (Korstjens & Moser, 2018). I created an audit trail using the
NVivo software by documenting each step of the process in the note and annotation sections of
the program as referenced above (see Appendix B).
At the end of this process, I developed a rich, thick, descriptive analysis of the findings
that included matrices, quotes, excerpts, and evidence that supported the underlying frames and
themes of the research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I engaged in a process known as reflexivity and
reflected on my own conceptual framework to determine how my own perceptions influenced
my research outcomes. According to Korstjens and Moser (2018), “As a qualitative researcher,
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you have to acknowledge the importance of being self-aware and reflexive about your own role
in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data, and in the preconceived
assumptions, you bring to your research” (p. 123). Thus, I identified limitations of the study and
made recommendations for future research.
In sum, qualitative content analysis is a very time consuming and challenging research
methodology. The categories and themes that are described by the researcher can be very
abstract. Since the analysis is based on interpretation, the initial coding of texts is crucial to the
research process. The codebook contains the operational definitions that are developed and
refined throughout the research process; if the coding is inaccurate, then the findings are invalid.
Invalid findings pose challenges to the researcher to demonstrate the credibility and authenticity
of the interpretation of the data (Graneheim, et al., 2017). Lincoln and Guba (1985)
recommended that credibility can be established through activities such as triangulation,
prolonged immersion into the data, audit trail, or peer debriefing - among other activities.
Verification Methods
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) trustworthiness is the rigorous procedures the
researcher maintains throughout the research process to ensure credibility. To ensure
trustworthiness the researcher must maintain credibility. Credibility can be maintained by
developing a thorough plan for data collection, adhering to a well-defined coding scheme, and
providing a descriptive report of the findings. Several practices were utilized during each phase
of this study to ensure trustworthiness and credibility of the data collected and reported results.
These practices included prolonged immersion into the data, audit trail, data triangulation (intrarater reliability), and reflexivity - practices Lincoln and Guba (1985) say help ensure credibility.
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Prolonged Immersion into the Data
According to Nowell, et al. (2017), an important step in establishing trustworthiness in
qualitative studies is the investment of appropriate time immersed in the data in which the
researcher develops an understanding of the data, systematically organizes the text, looks for
emerging patterns and ideas, identifies passages or themes based on the codebook, and detects
codes that challenge the codebook. As identified in Phase Two of the qualitative content analysis
procedure, I immersed myself into the amicus briefs and written opinions of the United States
Supreme Court justices and created a Reading Summary Form. This document has text passages
coded to match operational definitions based on the codebook for each amicus brief and justices’
opinion rendered in the case. Aside from creating a Reading Summary Form, I also created a
Thematically Clustered Matrix that chunks text from multiple briefs and justices’ opinions
together that matches the operational definitions identified in the codebook (see Appendix D).
Audit Trail
In addition to prolonged immersion into the data, some researchers recommend the
development of an audit trail (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Nowell, et al.,
2017). An audit trail is a systematic collection of materials that allow an independent auditor to
draw their own conclusions about the study based on the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). For my
audit trail I included raw data codified to a codebook identified during phase one and two of the
process, reflexive notes, and annotations maintained in NVivo during the data analysis phase
(see Appendices B and C). The provision of a decision trail that describes my rules for
categorizing data and making analytical inferences about the data are found in Table 5 through
Table 9, inclusive.
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Data Triangulation
Data triangulation involves the use of multiple data sources for the purpose of
authenticating conclusions (Denzin, 2012). This process is like what Krippendorff (2013) refers
to as the degree of stability. Stability is defined as the degree to which a process is unchanging
over time and over conditions. According to Krippendorff (2013), “The data for such
assessments are created under test-retest conditions; that is, one observer rereads, recodes, or
reanalyzes the same text after some time has elapsed, or the same measuring device is repeatedly
applied to one set of objects” (pp. 270-271). The test-retest method is sometimes referred to as
the intra-rater reliability method. This is where the rater uses a comparison coding sheet to track
first, second, and final coding’s of data to ensure consistency over time. Typically, the researcher
applies a coefficient of agreement method such Cohen’s kappa statistic to assess reliability
(Schreier, 2012). I checked consistency of my codes by calculating the average weighted percent
agreement among coding sessions in NVivo with at least a three-week span between coding
sessions.
Reflexivity
Reflexivity involves being aware of biases, prejudices, values, and judgments that the
researcher brings to the study. Creswell (2014) describes reflexivity as how the researcher
“reflects about how their role in the study and their personal background, culture, and
experiences hold potential for shaping their interpretations, such as themes they advance and the
meaning they ascribe to the data” (p. 186). To maintain reflexivity, I kept a journal in NVivo and
recorded my thoughts on how my previous experiences and readings about my research affected
my inquiry (see Appendix B). As part of the reflexivity process, I continuously assessed how my
own bias affected how I coded, analyzed, and reported the data.
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Role of the Researcher
Qualitative content analysis relies heavily on the researcher’s interpretation of the text’s
relationship with its’ intended audience. Being aware of my role as researcher was part of the
reflexivity process identified above. As the researcher for this study, I developed a codebook that
contained a list and description of all identified coding units of analysis (see Tables 5 through
table 9 inclusive). The codebook identified the major thematic messages within the amicus briefs
and written opinions of the justices. In addition, I explained the study’s findings and provided
details about the process that led to those findings. I discussed the limitations and strengths of the
study. I ensured trustworthiness by providing all appendices, tables, and notes where necessary
to support interpretations and conclusions drawn about the data (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009).
Creswell (2014) emphasizes that researchers must understand how their background may
shape the direction of the study, including their professional background. My personal interest in
this study evolved out of my more than 25 years as an educator and administrator. As an
educator, I developed an interest in how education policy was identified and formed during the
era of No Child Left Behind. I was intrigued by the rapidity in which President Bush’s education
agenda was implemented. Equally fascinating was the idea that a republican president partnered
with an iconic democratic leader, Ted Kennedy, to help push the legislation into law. My
curiosity led me to return to the classroom to study how education policy was made and
implemented at all levels of the legislative process. However, in recent years, it has become
evident that the legislative process can be bypassed as policy actors and interest groups seek to
avoid lengthy partisan debates by using the Court to mandate policy. This curiosity in how policy
actors and interest groups go about this process has led me to this study on how the United States
Supreme Court in recent years has become the arbitrator for many education policy decisions.
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Conclusion
Chapter three of this study described the methodology and research design. All aspects of
the research process were identified based on the qualitative content analysis method identified
in this study. I discussed the procedures for data collection, data analysis, data reporting, and the
development of the codebook. I included a visual for my research design (see Figure 1). I
provided samples of my proposed codebook based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic
frames in Table 5 through Table 9 inclusive. I identified and discussed verification methods that
I used to establish trustworthiness. Finally, I discussed my role as researcher and identified areas
that may affect my reflexivity on this study.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The first purpose of this qualitative content analysis was to identify the policy frames
interest groups used in amicus briefs to frame policy preferences in the United States Supreme
Court case Espinoza v Montana (2020).112 A second purpose was to determine which (if any)
policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerged in the written opinions of the justices. The
findings of this study provide educational leaders, policy makers, and future researchers with
information about which frames chosen by interest groups to frame policy preferences may (or
may not) influence the Courts’ opinion, and ultimately education policy and law.
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, a review of the coding process and results
of intra-rater reliability were presented. In section two, a brief background was provided for each
of the 18 amicus briefs selected for this study and each justice who served on the Supreme Court
when Espinoza was decided. In the third section, findings were reported for each research
question. In the fourth section results were reported for the themes that emerged from the codes.
Section One: Coding Process and Intra-rater Reliability
The following is a brief review of the coding process and the results of the intra-rater
reliability. A detailed description of the methodology used to conduct this study can be found in
Chapter 3.
Coding Process
Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames were used as a lens to analysis the
amicus briefs and justices written opinions in Espinoza. These frames were entered into NVivo
as a priori codes as identified in Table 11. Next, the amicus briefs and justices written opinions

112

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
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Table 11
Description of A Priori Coding Frames

Frame/A Priori Code

Definition

Conflict frame

This frame emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups,
or institutions. This code applies to all references to
individuals, groups, or institutions engaged in conflict.
Conflict is defined as a clash of interest and the basis of the
conflict may be personal, religious, racial, class, or political.

Attribution of
responsibility frame

This frame emphasizes beliefs about the cause of an event or
outcome of a situation. This frame attributes responsibility or a
solution to a situation to either the government, individual, or
group.

Morality frame

This frame puts the event, problem, or issue in context of
religious tenets or moral prescriptions. It usually contains a
moral message or prescription about how to behave.

Economic consequences
frame

This frame reports an event, problem, or issue in terms of the
consequences it will have economically on an individual,
groups, or organizations.

Human interest frame

This frame brings a human face or an emotional angle to the
presentation of an event, issue, or problem. It presents people
and their problems, concerns, or achievements in a way that
brings out empathy.

Note. Adapted from “Framing European Politics: A Content Analysis of Press and Television
News” by Semetko, H. A., & Valkenburg, P. M., 2000, Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93109.
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were uploaded into NVivo and organized into folders. Once assigned folders, each amicus brief
and justices’ opinion were assigned a case. Cases in NVivo represent units of analysis which in
this study were represented by the amicus briefs and justices written opinions.
After the amicus briefs were organized into cases, each brief was assigned a position
attribute based on whether the brief sought to reverse or affirm the decision. The same procedure
was followed for judicial opinions. If the document was a majority opinion or concurring
(majority) opinion, then the position attribute was concurring. If the document was a minority
opinion including dissenting opinions, then the position attribute was dissenting.
The attributes assigned to each case were utilized to organize the data in NVivo so that a
variety of queries could be explored through NVivo’s exploration features such as charts,
diagrams, and cluster analysis. These features were utilized to help identify patterns and
relationships. NVivo’s auto-coding feature was used to identify emerging sub-themes related to
the dominant frame in each brief and written opinion. These sub-themes are discussed in sections
three as emerging themes as they relate to each dominant frame.
Intra-Rater Reliability
Intra-rater reliability is a method used by qualitative researchers to measure consistency
within an individual coders coding process (Neuendorf, 2017). Intra-rater reliability is measured
in studies where there is only one coder who codes data during at least two separate periods of
time. Typically, reliability measures of .80 or higher are considered reliable (Neuendorf, 2017).
Data for this study was coded over a period of two months. During the coding period, I coded 18
amicus briefs and seven justices written opinions at two separate time intervals with at least three
weeks between coding periods. Using the codebook created based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s
(2000) generic frames, I coded 1,183 references during the first coding period. A reference is a
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piece of text that has been coded to one of the codes in a codebook. The same documents were
coded at the later time interval and checked for reliability. I coded 1,185 references during the
second coding period. Although there was three or more weeks between coding periods, I was
able to maintain a high consistency in coding with an intra-rater reliability rate of .85 or 85%.
Section Two: Background of Selected Amici Curiae and Supreme Court Justices
In this next section I discussed the various backgrounds of the amici curiae acting on
behalf of interest groups who filed briefs in Espinoza. I also provided background information on
the Supreme Court justices who presided over this case.
Amici Curiae
The background of the amici curiae who filed briefs on behalf of interest groups in
Espinoza cover a broad spectrum of political and social groups. Amici curiae, acting on behalf of
interest groups which included think tanks, state coalitions, 131 current and former state
legislators and governors, teacher unions or affiliations, and religious organizations, filed 45
amicus briefs either in opposition to or support of the lower court’s ruling. Of the 18 selected
amicus briefs used in this study, nine represented liberal and/or conservative non-profit
organizations (NPO), four represented religious organizations, three represented educational
related industry associations or unions, one represented a libertarian think tank, and one
represented five individuals.
Several of the selected briefs had more than one organization or individual sponsor the
brief. To identify the brief each one was assigned a Lead Amici based on the first organization or
individual represented on the cover page of the brief. For example, Brief of EdChoice, Reason
Foundation, and the Individual Rights Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners is
identified in Table 12 as Lead Amici - EdChoice. Also found in Table 12 is a brief description of
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Table 12
Description of 18 Amicus Briefs Used in This Study
Lead Amici

Mission/Belief Statement

Position

Dominant Frame

Americans for Prosperity and Yes, Every
Kid
1310 N. Courthouse rd. Suite 700
Arlington, VA. 22201
https://americansforprosperity.org/about

“Americans for Prosperity is dedicated to the belief that every person has
a unique set of gifts and the ability to contribute to society in their own
way, an idea that has inspired progress since our country’s founding.”

Reverse

Attribution of
Responsibility

Billy Graham Evangelist Assoc, et.al.
1 Billy Graham Parkway, Charlotte NC
28201
https://www.billygraham.org/about

“Continuing the lifelong work of Billy Graham, the Billy Graham
Evangelistic Association exists to support and extend the evangelistic
calling and ministry of Franklin Graham by proclaiming the Gospel of the
Lord Jesus Christ to all we can by every effective means available to us
and by equipping the church and others to do the same.”

Reverse

Conflict

Center for Education Reform
1455 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Suite 462
Washington, DC 20004
https://edreform.com/about-2

“The mission of the Center for Education Reform is to expand educational
opportunities that lead to improved economic outcomes for all Americans,
particularly our youth, ensuring that conditions are ripe for innovation,
freedom and flexibility throughout U.S. education.”

Reverse

Human Interest

EdChoice
111 Monument Circle Suite 2650
Indianapolis, IN 46204
https://www.edchoice.org/who-we-are/

“The EdChoice mission is to advance educational freedom and choice for
all as a pathway to successful lives and a stronger society.”

Reverse

Attribution of
Responsibility

Georgia Goal Scholarship Program
3740 Davinci Court Suite 375
Peachtree Corners, GA 30092
https://www.goalscholarship.org/about
_goal/page/mission

“The mission of Georgia GOAL Scholarship Program is to provide
greater opportunities for access to learning for all Georgia children.”

Reverse

Human Interest

Note. Mission/belief statement information obtained from Lead Amici’s organization website and/or brief.
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Table 12 cont.
Description of 18 Amicus Briefs Used in This Study
Lead Amici

Mission/Belief Statement

Position

Dominant Frame

Jerry and Kathy Armstrong/Pacific Legal
Foundation, et al.
555 Capitol Mall, Suite 1290
Sacramento, CA 95814
https://pacificlegal.org

“Pacific Legal Foundation is a nonprofit legal organization that defends
Americans’ liberties when threatened by government overreach and
abuse.”

Reverse

Human Interest

Justice and Freedom Fund et al.
371 San Clemente
San Clemente, CA 92772
(No website)

“Justice and Freedom Fund is a California non-profit, tax-exempt
corporation formed to preserve and defend the constitutional liberties
guaranteed to American citizens, through education, legal advocacy, and
other means.”113

Reverse

Conflict

Liberty Justice Center and Am. Fed. for
Children
440 N. Wells St. Suite 200
Chicago, IL 60654
https://libertyjusticecenter.org/about/

“Liberty Justice Center fights for the constitutional rights of American
families, workers, advocates, and entrepreneurs.”

Reverse

Conflict

The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20001
https://www.cato.org/about

“The mission of the Cato Institute is to originate, disseminate, and
increase understanding of public policies based on the principles of
individual liberty, limited government, free markets, and peace. Our
vision is to create free, open, and civil societies founded on libertarian
principles.”

Reverse

Morality

American Fed. of Teachers et al.
555 New Jersey Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
https://www.aft.org/about/mission

“The American Federation of Teachers is a union of professionals that
champions fairness; democracy; economic opportunity; and high-quality
public education, healthcare and public services for our students, their
families, and our communities.”

Affirm

Human Interest

Note. Mission/belief statement information obtained from Lead Amici’s organization website and/or brief.
Brief for Justice and Freedom Fund, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020)
(No. 01-1015), Briefs Lexis 4619.
113
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Table 12 cont.
Description of 18 Amicus Briefs Used in This Study

Lead Amici

Mission/Belief Statement

Position

Dominant Frame

Baptist Joints Commission200
Maryland Ave., N. E. Washington, DC
20002
https://bjconline.org/?s=
mission+state%2Cemt

“BJC’s mission is to defend and extend God-given religious liberty
for all, furthering the Baptist heritage that champions the principle
that religion must be freely exercised, neither advanced nor inhibited
by government.”

Affirm

Human Interest

Freedom from Religion Foundation
PO Box 750
Madison, WI 53701
https://ffrf.org/about

“The purposes of the Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., as
stated in its bylaws, are to promote the constitutional principle of
separation of state and church, and to educate the public on
matters relating to non-theism.”

Affirm

Economic
Consequence

Montana/N. Wyoming Conf., et al.
2016 Alderson Ave.
Billings, MT 59102
http://www.mnwcucc.org

“Drawn together by the Holy Spirit, we are a distinct and diverse
community of Christians that come together as one church,
joining faith and action. In covenant with the church in all of its
settings, we serve God in the co-creation of a just and sustainable
world as made manifest in the Gospel of Jesus Christ.”

Affirm

Conflict

Montana Association of Rabbis
McDermott Will & Emery LLP 500
North Capital Street, NW Washington,
DC 20001
(No website)

“Montana Association of Rabbis is an association formed for the
purpose of providing a rabbinical voice for Montana’s Jews.
MAOR may issue position papers and statements, respond to
government policy and initiatives, engage in collaborative work
with other religious and advocacy organizations, and perform
other activities that address issues affecting the Jewish
community of Montana.”114

Affirm

Conflict

Note. Mission/belief statement information obtained from Lead Amici’s organization website and/or brief.
Brief for Montana Association of Rabbis as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020)
(No. 01-1015), Briefs Lexis 6585.
114
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Table 12 cont.
Description of 18 Amicus Briefs Used in This Study
Lead Amici

Mission/Belief Statement

Position

Dominant Frame

National Disability Network
820 First St. NE, Suite 740
Washington, DC 20002
https://www.ndrn.org/about/

“NDRN’s mission is to promote the integrity and capacity of
the P&A and CAP national network and to advocate for the
enactment and vigorous enforcement of laws protecting civil
and human rights of people with disabilities. NDRN has a
vision of a society where people with disabilities have equality
of opportunity and are able to participate fully in community
life by exercising choice and self-determination.”

Affirm

Human Interest

National School Board Association
1680 Duke St. FL. 2
Alexandria, VA 22314
https://www.nsba.org/about

“Working with and through our State Associations and the
U.S. territory of the Virgin Islands, NSBA Advocates for
Equity and Excellence in Public Education through School
Board Leadership.”

Affirm

Economic
Consequence

Public Finds Public Schools
60 Park Place, Suite 300
Newark, NJ 07102
https://pfps.org/about.html

“Efforts to undermine public education by promoting the use
of public funds for private education, including through
various kinds of private school vouchers (traditional private
school vouchers, tax credit vouchers, and education savings
account vouchers, among others), must be met with a robust,
sustained response to safeguard the nation's public schools.”

Affirm

Conflict

Tennessee Education Association
801 Second Avenue
North Nashville, TN 37201
https://www.teateachers.org/
about-tea

“The mission of the Tennessee education Association is to
protect and advocate for our students, our profession, and our
members to create great public schools that prepare everyone
for success in global society.”

Affirm

Economic
Consequence

Note. Mission/belief statement information obtained from Lead Amici’s organization website and/or brief.
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the lead organizations mission and belief statements retrieved from the organization’s website or
mission statement found in the section of each brief labeled Interest of Amicus. Table 12 also
identifies the amici’s position and dominant frame coded within each brief.
Information about the United States Supreme Court Justices who served on the bench at
the time of Espinoza can be found in Table 13. Table 13 also identifies the justices’ position, and
dominant frame coded within each written opinion. To recap, the question the Court was asked
to address was as follows:
Does a state law that allows for funding for education generally while prohibiting funding
for religious schools violate the Religion Clauses of the Equal Protection Clause of the
federal Constitution?115
Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the Court. Justices Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, and the newly appointed Kavanaugh joined. In addition, Justice Thomas filed a
separate concurring opinion which Justice Alito also joined. Justices Alito and Gorsuch also filed
separate concurring opinions. Aside from those who concurred with the majority opinion of the
Court, Justice Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Breyer filed dissenting opinions. Justice Kagan joined
with both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer in their separate dissenting opinions.
In conclusion, 18 amicus briefs and seven justices’ written opinions were coded for
dominant frames based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames. Approximately
1,185 references were coded across the dataset. Dominant codes were identified for the amicus
curiae briefs and the justices’ written opinions. Dominant frames based on the attributes of the
amicus briefs and justices’ opinions were discussed along with the dominant emerging theme
identified in each brief and opinion.

115

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).

89

Table 13
Supreme Court Justices Background Information, Position, and Frame Findings
Justice

Background Information

Type of Opinion

Dominant Frame
Findings

John G. Roberts, Jr.
Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme
Court

Born January 27, 1955, Roberts was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
September 29, 2005, by President George W. Bush.

Majority opinion
joined by Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh

Attribution of
Responsibility

Clarence Thomas
Associate Justice

Born June 23, 1948, Thomas was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
October 23, 1991, by President George H.W. Bush.

Concurring/joined by
Gorsuch

Attribution of
Responsibility

Stephen G. Breyer
Associate Justice

Born August 15, 1938, Breyer was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
August 3, 1994, by President Bill Clinton.

Dissenting/joined by
Kagan

Human Interest

Samuel A. Alito, Jr.
Associate Justice

Born April 1, 1950, Alito was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on January
31, 2006, by President George W. Bush.

Concurring

Human Interest

Sonia Sotomayor
Associate Justice

Born June 25, 1954, Sotomayor was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
August 8, 2009, by President Barack Obama.

Dissenting

Attribution of
Responsibility

Elena Kagan
Associate Justice

Born April 28, 1960, Kagan was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
August 7, 2010, by President Barack Obama.

Dissenting/joined with
Ginsburg and Breyer

N/A

Neil M. Gorsuch
Associate Justice

Born August 29, 1967, Gorsuch was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
April 10, 2017, by President Donald J. Trump.

Concurring

Conflict

Brett M. Kavanaugh
Associate Justice

Born February 12, 1965, Kavanaugh was appointed to the United States Supreme Court
on October 6, 2018, by President Donald J. Trump.

Joined with majority
opinion

N/A

Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Associate Justice

Born March 15, 1933, Ginsburg was appointed to the United States Supreme Court on
August 10, 1993, by President Bill Clinton. Ginsburg died on September 18, 2020.

Dissenting

Ties w/attribution
of responsibility,
conflict, and
economic
consequence

Note. Information obtained from Supreme Court of the United States at https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx
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Section Three: Research Question Findings
This section of this chapter addressed the two research questions that guided this study.
The research questions were as follows:
RQ1. What dominant policy frames do interest groups use to frame policy preferences
in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)?
RQ2. Which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerge in the written
opinions of the United States Supreme Court justices in Espinoza v. Montana
(2020)?
RQ1: Amicus Briefs – Dominant Frames
To answer the first research question of this study each brief was analyzed using Semetko
and Valkenburg’s (2020) generic frames. A codebook was developed as identified in chapter 3
Table 5 through Table 9 inclusive. Each brief was coded based on the criteria identified in the
codebook. The total number of code references contained within all the amicus briefs totaled
1,005. All the amicus briefs had varying units of analysis as well as coding due to the different
lengths of individual briefs, therefore the frequency of the code reference was converted from
raw frequencies to percentages. This data was used to determine the least to most dominant
frames across all the briefs by calculating the percentage outcome for each policy frame. This
information can be found in Table 14.
Among the individual briefs, the most dominant frame was the human-interest frame. The
second most dominant frame was the conflict frame. The economic consequence frame was the
third dominant frame. The attribution of responsibility frame was the fourth dominant frame, and
the least dominant frame was the morality frame. Surprisingly, there was more than an 18%
spread between the most dominant frame (human interest) and least dominant frame (morality).
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Table 14
Amicus Briefs: Results by Frame, Frequency of Code Reference, and Percentage of References

Frame

Frequency of code reference

Percentage

Morality frame

128

12.74%

Attribution of responsibility

137

13.63%

Economic consequence frame

173

17.21%

Conflict frame

258

25.67%

Human Interest frame

309

30.755

1,005

100%

Total
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After identifying the dominant frames based on each individual brief, dominant frames
based on the positionality of the interest group were identified (i.e., whether the amici curiae
writing on behalf of the interest groups advocated to reverse or affirm the lower court decision).
When the amicus briefs were evaluated based on whether the interest groups advocated for
reversal or affirmation of the lower court’s decision, a richer more detailed story emerged among
the interest groups which demonstrated their different perceptions of the case. These differences
among interest groups perceptions determined which frame each individual interest groups were
more likely to use to frame their policy preference. The percentage of frame usage by petitioners
and respondents is reported in Figure 2.
One difference, for example was that respondents cast policy preferences based on the
human-interest frame 33.21% of the time while petitioners based their policy preference on the
human-interest frame only 27.75% of the time – a clear 5.5% spread. Respondents were 5.7%
more likely than petitioners to frame policy preferences based on the economic consequence
frame, while petitioners were 6.5% more likely to reference concerns based on the morality
frame. Respondents were less likely than petitioners to attribute responsibility of an event or
situation to some other entity such as the government, individual, or group. Furthermore,
petitioners were less likely to reference conflict as a policy frame than respondents.
The largest spread among the interest groups was within the attribution of responsibility
frame. Respondents were coded to this frame 9.44% while petitioners were coded to this frame
18.72%. with a 9.3% spread. The code with the least spread among the interest groups was the
conflict code. Petitioners were coded to this frame 23.13% while respondents coded to this frame
27.77% with a spread of 4.64%.
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Figure 2
Percentage of Policy Frames Coded to Petitioners and Respondents
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Morality Frame

RQ2: Justices Written Opinions – Dominant Frames
The second research question of this study identified the dominant frames found in each
of the justices’ opinions. Each opinion was analyzed using Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000)
generic frames based on the codebook identified in chapter 3 Table 5 through Table 9 inclusive.
After identifying the dominant frame in each justices’ opinion, each of the five frames were
evaluated to determine which frame was dominant across all the justices’ opinions. Like the
amicus briefs, all the opinions had varying units of analysis as well as coding due to the different
lengths of the opinions, therefore the frequency of the coding inquiry was converted from raw
frequencies to percentages. This information is provided in Table 15.
As shown in Table 15, the total number of code references contained within the opinions
totals 180. The dominant frame across the justices’ opinions was the attribution of responsibility
frame and the least dominant was the economic consequences frame. The second dominant
frame was the conflict frame. When the opinions are evaluated based on whether the justices
concurred or dissented differences among the justices emerge. For example, concurring justices
cast policy preferences based on the human-interest frame 27% of the time, while dissenting
justices based their policy preference on the human-interest frame only 18.75% of the time.
Dissenting justices were 7.75% more likely than concurring justices to frame policy preferences
based on the attribution of responsibility frame, while concurring justices were 3.50% more
likely to reference concerns based on the morality frame. In addition, concurring justices were
less likely than dissenting justices to attribute responsibility of an event or situation to some
other entity such as the government, individual, or group. Furthermore, the concurring justices
were 4.25% less likely to reference economic consequences as a policy frame than the dissenting
justices. The percentage of frame usage by justices’ is reported in Figure 3.
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Table 15
Justices’ Opinions: Results by Frame, Frequency of Code Reference, and Percentage of
References

Frame

Frequency of code reference

Percentage

Economic consequence frame

16

8.90%

Morality frame

26

14.44%

Human interest frame

42

23.33%

Conflict frame

43

23.89%

Attribution of responsibility
frame

53

29.44%

180

100%

Total

96
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Figure 3
Percentage of Policy Frames Coded to Concurring and Dissenting Justices
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Morality Frame

Section Four: Emerging Themes
In this section emerging themes based on Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic
frames were explored. NVivo auto code software was used to identify emerging themes within
each a priori frame identified in the codebook. The emerging themes that resulted from this
query were reported as a frequency of occurrences for each generic frame. Furthermore, to
understand how these emerging themes were framed by interest groups each theme was explored
by highlighting excerpts from the text of the briefs and opinions. By illuminating how interest
groups and justices referenced the theme a more comprehensive understanding of how interest
groups frame policy preferences were formed.
To better visualize data from multiple sources excerpts from the briefs and opinions
matching the emerging theme were identified and organized into a thematically clustered matrix
for easy comparison. Frequency counts provided some insight into how often interest groups and
justices used frames, but the written text provided greater understanding of how emerging
themes were used to frame policy preferences. Placing this data into a thematically clustered
matrix made it easier to identify nuances within the variety of text. This information was
organized around each generic frame, emerging theme, and type of text (i.e., amicus brief or
justices’ opinion). The result of this query is discussed in the section that follows.
Thematically Clustered Matrix
The following information was organized around each a priori code identified in the code
book, emerging themes, and text that illuminated the discussion. The frequency information for
each a priori code was provided in a chart and the discussion was organized into a matrix for
each a priori code and emerging frame. This information served to highlight how interest groups
and justices used the same frame to emphasize different aspects of the same topic.

98

Attribution of Responsibility Frame
This frame emphasized beliefs about the cause of an event or outcome of a situation.
This frame attributed responsibility or a solution to a situation to either the government,
individual, group, or program established by one of the aforementioned. The emerging theme
identified in this frame was Religion Clauses.
Religion Clause
The Religion Clauses theme referred to the two clauses found within the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution which contains two provisions concerning
religion. The Establishment Clause forbids the federal government from establishing an official
state religion, and the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the state from interference with religious
beliefs. Eight petitioners, six respondents, and five justices referenced this emerging theme. The
National School Board Association referenced this theme 15 times. The Justice and Freedom
Fund referenced the theme 18 times. Justice Thomas referenced this emerging theme 28 times
while Justice Breyer referenced the emerging theme 12 times.
Amicus Briefs. It is evident that the amici for Americans for Prosperity’s negative
language (root out, wholly incompatible) signaled discontent with past decisions made by the
Court as it related to the Religion Clauses. In the written brief, amici listed several cases
reviewed by the Court in which they believe the Court erred in its decision. The respondent,
Freedom from Religion Foundation, conversely, cited evidence of how the Court reaffirmed the
Courts decision in Everson v. Board of Education (1947). Amici for Freedom of Religion
foundation stated, “The American experiment in separating state and church succeeded. We lack
the oppressive history of government-enforced tithing.”116

116

Brief for Freedom from Religion Foundation, et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza v.
Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6523, *6.
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Petitioners for the Liberty Justice Center, on the other hand, attributed the responsibility
of the failure to honor adherences to the Religion Clauses as a failure on the part of the Montana
Department of Revenue to protect students by denying students the option of attending a
religious school. Amici for Liberty Justice Center stated:
The department’s rule flips the Establishment Clause on its head. It uses the power of the
state to the exercise of civil liberties. Thus, the department finds itself as the bouncer…
barring the schoolhouse door to low-income children by relying on the state Blaine
Amendment.117
Justices Opinions. In his written opinion Justice Thomas attributed what he perceives as
missteps in previous cases regarding the religion clauses to the Courts. Thomas specifically
stated that his purpose for writing a separate opinion was to explain how the Establishment
Clause interfered with free exercise rights. Thomas wrote, “Until we correct course on that
interpretation, individuals will continue to face needless obstacles in their attempts to vindicate
their religious freedom.”118 Justice Breyer, however, believes the Religion Clauses have helped
the Court navigate potential discord. Breyer wrote, “Taken together, the Religion Clauses have
helped our Nation avoid religiously based discord while securing liberty for those of all
faiths.”119
The frequency count for each amici curiae and justice was provided in Figure 4.
Information illustrating how amici and the justices used this theme to help frame arguments as
they related to the religion clause subtheme was displayed in Table 16.

117
Brief for the Liberty Justice Center and American Federation for Children as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs Lexis 5118, *16.
118
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2263 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
119
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2281 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

100

Tennessee Education Association

1

National School Boards Association

15

Montana Association of Rabbis

14

Montana Northern Wyoming Conference

2

Freedom from Religion Foundation

3

Brief of Baptist Joint Committee

8

The Cato Institute

13

Liberty Justice Center

15

Justice and Freedom Fund

18

Georgia Goal Scholarship Program Inc.

1

EdChoice Amici Curiae Brief

1

Center for Ed Reform

8

Billy Graham Evangelist Assc.

14

Americans for Prosperity

3

Justice Stephen Breyer

12
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4

Opinion of the Court Johns Roberts

8
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1
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Frequency of Attribution of Responsibility Frame: Sub-Theme Religion Clause
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Table 16
Attribution of Responsibility Matrix: Sub-Theme Religion Clauses

Case

Position

Excerpt
“By trying to root out religious participation from a neutral program, the
Montana Supreme Court applied a framework that is wholly incompatible
with this Court’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence.”120

Americans for Prosperity

Reverse

Freedom from Religion
Foundation

Affirm

Justice Thomas

Concurring

“Thus, as I have explained, Locke incorrectly interpreted the Establishment
Clause and should not impact free exercise challenges. Yet, as Montana’s
proffered justification for its law shows, governments continue to rely on
Locke’s improper understanding of ‘antiestablishment interests’ to defend
against free exercise challenges.”122

Justice Breyer

Dissenting

“That, in significant part, is why the Court has held that ‘there is room for play
in the joints’ between the Clauses’ express prohibitions that is ‘productive of a
benevolent neutrality,’ allowing religious exercise to exist without
sponsorship and without interference.”123

“The Court’s lengthy discussions of the meaning and purposes of the First
Amendment’s religion clauses in these cases focused on the separation of
religion and government—to the benefit of both. The Court never hinted that
the religion clauses actually require taxpayers to fund religion.”121

120
Brief for Americans for Prosperity, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020)
(No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4433, *14.
121
Brief for Freedom from Religion Foundation, et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct.
2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6523, *18.
122
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2265 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).
123
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2282 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Conflict Frame
This frame emphasized conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions. This code
applied to all references to individuals, groups, or institutions engaged in conflict. Conflict is
defined as a clash of interest and the basis of the conflict may be personal, religious, racial, class,
or political. The emerging theme identified in this frame was private schools.
Private School
The private schools theme referred to schools that are separate from public schools and
require a fee paid by the student’s family to attend. Some states allow the transfer of public funds
in the form of school vouchers, education saving accounts, and scholarship tax credits paid
directly to parents to use at a private school of their choice. Vouchers, or scholarship programs,
allow students to use public monies to attend a private school of their choice. Education Savings
Accounts make a portion of funds spent by the state at local public schools available to parents in
the form of a spending account to use for private school tuition or other specified services. Nine
petitioners, nine respondents, and five justices referenced this emerging theme. EdChoice
referenced this theme 50 times and the National School Board Association referenced the theme
71 times. Chief Justice Roberts referenced this emerging theme 22 times while both Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer referenced the emerging theme nine times.
Amicus Briefs. Use of public funds to pay for private school tuition is often contentious.
The debate often centers around issues of funding. Amici for EdChoice contended that at the
center of this debate was the restrictive Blaine Amendments which limited or prevented states
from funding private education which in turn limited parent choice due to the cost. EdChoice
argued that individual tax credits and deductions allow parents to receive state income tax relief
for approved educational expenses, which can include private school tuition, books, supplies,
computers, tutors, and transportation. EdChoice argued, “Parents know what they want for their
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children, but they often are not able to access the type of educational environment they desire for
their child’s education.”124
Amici for the National School Board Association (NSBA), however, contended that
programs that offered tax incentives or credits “purposely skirt state and federal legal
constrictions, such as Montana’s ‘no-aid’ provision, by funneling state dollars through parents or
scholarship nonprofit corporations that in turn pay some portion of tuition at private schools”.125
This shift in funding ultimately hurts public schools and hinders public schools’ ability to
provide an abundance of programs that meet student needs. The NSBA argued that Montana’s
constitutional prohibition on funding to religious schools was based on the states dedication to
ensuring top priority to the funding of public schools.
Justices’ Opinions. Chief Justice Roberts disagreed with the NSBA. Roberts stated,
“Montana’s interest in public education cannot justify a ‘no-aid’ provision that requires
only religious private schools to ‘bear [its] weight.’ A State need not subsidize private
education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools
solely because they are religious.”126
Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, argued that a state was under no obligation to pay for private
education, and that it was within the states right to choose not to fund private education.127
The frequency count for each amici curiae and justice was provided in Figure 5.
Information illustrating how amici and the justices used this theme to help frame arguments as
they related to the religion clause subtheme was displayed in Table 17.
Brief for EdChoice, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4461, *23.
125
Brief for National School Boards Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis, 6535,
*44.
126
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020) (Roberts, CJ).
127
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2281 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
124
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Tennessee Education Association

25

Public Funds Public Schools

48

National School Boards Association

71

National Disability Rights Network

120

Montana Association of Rabbis

32

Montana Northern Wyoming Conference

8

Freedom from Religion Foundation

11

Brief of Baptist Joint Committee

6

Am Fed of Teachers

15

The Cato Institute

9

Liberty Justice Center

23

Justice and Freedom Fund

45

Jerry and Kathy Armstrong

9

Georgia Goal Scholarship Program Inc.

8

EdChoice Amici Curiae Brief

50

Center for Ed Reform
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Billy Graham Evangelist Assc.

27
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9
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Table 17
Conflict Frame Matrix: Sub-Theme Private Schools

Case

Position

Excerpt

Center for Education Reform

Reverse

“Accordingly, the critical liberty interest of pursuing the most desirable education for
one’s child is promoted by programs that expand the options for parents to send their
children to schools beyond their zip code—whether they take the form of vouchers,
educational savings accounts, or tax credit scholarship programs.”128

National School Boards Assoc.

Affirm

“If this Court decides to address whether the Montana constitutional provision as
applied by its Supreme Court passes muster under the U.S. Constitution, Amici urge it
not to steer away from its recognition that states may choose not to fund religious
instruction in favor of supporting their public schools, and to consider the harm that
will result to public education from any dramatic shift in its existing precedents.”129

Chief Justice Roberts

Concurring

“Applying this provision to the scholarship program, the Montana Supreme Court
noted that most of the private schools that would benefit from the program were
‘religiously affiliated’ and ‘controlled by churches,’ and the Court ultimately
concluded that the scholarship program ran afoul of the Montana Constitution by
aiding schools controlled by churches.”130

Justice Ginsburg

Dissenting

“A State may distinguish within a benefit program between secular and sectarian
schools, or it may decline to fund all private schools. The Court agrees that the First
Amendment permits the latter course.”131

Brief for Center for Education Reform, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, Espinoza v.
Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4618, *15.
129
Brief for National School Boards Association et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct.
2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis, 6535, *14.
130
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2256 (2020).
131
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2280 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
128
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Economic Consequence Frame
This frame reported an event, problem, or issue in terms of the economic consequences it
had on individuals, groups, or organizations, and/or benefits/disadvantages of free market
competition. The emerging theme identified in this frame was tax credits.
Tax Credits
Tax credits are incentives offered by a government entity that allows taxpayers to deduct
the amount of the tax credit from the money they owe to the state. The contributed tax credit is
donated to a student scholarship organization (SSO). As stated in chapter one, an SSO is nonprofit organizations that receive donations from businesses or individuals that in turn distributes
funds in the form of tuition scholarships to students who attend private schools. The issue of tax
credits was at the heart of the Espinoza. Nine petitioners, seven respondents, and five justices
referenced this emerging theme.
Amicus Briefs. Tennessee Education Association (TEA) referenced this theme six times
and the Billy Graham Evangelist Assoc. referenced the theme eight times. According to amici for
the TEA, tax credits are a means of repaying taxpayers who donate to student scholarship
organizations (SSO) who support private education. TEA argued that the use of taxpayer funds
to enable parents to send their child to a private school hurts public education because it takes
much needed funds away from public schools.132 The American Federation of Teachers (AFT)
also supported this position.
Opposing TEA and AFT, amici for Billy Graham Evangelist Assoc. argued that like
charitable organizations tax credits are not public funds because the money passes from
taxpayers directly to private organizations. Amici for Billy Graham Evangelist Assoc. contended

132 Brief for the Tennessee Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza v. Montana
Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6590, *18.
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that the funds were never part of the state’s treasury because contrary to the oppositions
argument it was erroneous to assume that taxpayer income “should be treated as if it were
government property even if it has not come into tax collectors’ hands…when the government
decides not to tax something, it is granting a beneficence …”133
Justices’ Opinions. Justice Gorsuch referenced this emerging theme seven times while
Justice Breyer referenced this emerging theme two times. Justice Gorsuch, in support of the Billy
Graham’s organization position, argued donations enable school choice and without taxpayer
support scholarships school choice in Montana would disappear. Gorsuch wrote,
The people of Montana, acting through their legislature, adopted a school choice
program. It provided a modest tax credit to individuals and businesses who donated to
nonprofit scholarship organizations… What benefits the government decides to give,
whether meager or munificent, it must give without discrimination against religious
conduct.134
Justice Breyer argued that states have taken advantage of the ‘play in the joints’ between the
Religion Clauses to develop programs which are designed to assist parents in the reimbursement
of private school. Breyer writes, “…government benefits come in many shapes and sizes. The
appropriate way to approach a State’s benefit-related decision may well vary depending upon the
relation between the Religion Clauses and the specific benefit and restriction at issue.”135
The frequency count for each amici curiae and justice is provided in Figure 6.
Information illustrating how amici and the justices used this theme to help frame arguments as it
related to the religion clause subtheme is displayed in Table 18.

133 Brief for Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, et al., as Curiae Amicus in Support of the Petitioners, Espinoza v.
Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5980, *10.

134
135

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2274 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2290 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Table 18
Economic Consequences Frame Matrix: Sub-Theme Tax Credits
Case

Position

Excerpt

“When the Montana Supreme Court predicated its decision on the assumption that the
State owns all property it could tax and, thus, that the State is itself making a donation
by giving a credit for an individual’s donation, it assumed, albeit implicitly, that the
State, like a communist or totalitarian form of government, was the owner and
dispenser of all property and privileges. In doing so, it violated the guarantee in the
Federal Constitution that (stating that racial segregation government be republican in
form.”136
“The types of school-choice-at-taxpayer expense programs at issue here frustrate the
societal purposes of public education by diverting government funds that otherwise
would be spent to achieve those societal purposes.”137

Billy Graham Evangelist
Association

Reverse

Tennessee Education
Association

Affirm

Justice Gorsuch

Concurring

“Those seeking a tax credit were free to choose whether to direct their donations to
the independent scholarship organization; the organization was then free to choose
scholarship recipients; and, after that, parents were free to choose where to use those
scholarships.”138

Justice Breyer

Dissenting

“Nor can I see how it could make a difference that the Establishment Clause might
permit the State to subsidize religious education through a program like Montana’s.
The dissenting tax benefit here inures to donors, who choose to support a particular
scholarship organization. That organization, in turn, awards scholarships to students
for the qualifying school of their choice."139

Brief for Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, et al., as Curiae Amicus in Support of the Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140
S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5980, *21.
137
Brief for the Tennessee Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246
(2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6590, *18.
138
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2274 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
139
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2287 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
136
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Human Interest Frame
This frame effected a human face or an emotional angle to the presentation of an event,
issue, or problem. It presented people and their problems, concerns, or achievements in a
historical context and/or in a way that elicited empathy. The emerging theme identified in this
frame was school choice.
School Choice
There are two general categories for school choice: public and private. Public school
choice offers educational choice within the public school system such as charter schools, magnet
schools, or open enrollment. Private school choice generally involves the transfer of public funds
in the form of school vouchers, education saving accounts, and scholarship tax credits paid
directly to parents to use at a private school of their choice. Eight petitioners, six respondents,
and five justices referenced this emerging theme. Justice Alito referenced this emerging theme
four times while Justice Sotomayor referenced this emerging theme only once. The Liberty
Justice Center referenced this theme 20 times and the National Disability Rights Network
(NDRN) referenced the theme five times.
Amicus Briefs. According to the Liberty Justice Center some parents favored school
choice options because it allowed them to enroll their student in a school that supports their faithbased values, while other parents choose a school to meet the unique social-emotional needs of
their student. Amici for the Liberty Justice Center, et. al., stated:
There are numerous reasons why a family from a minority religion wish to send its
children to a school affiliated with its faith…parents may wish to raise their children in
their faith and send them to a school that offer systematic religious instruction.140

140

Brief for the Liberty Justice Center, et al., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners. Espinoza v.
Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5118, *8.
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Amici for the National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) oppose the Liberty Justice Centers
perspective on school choice. The NDRN purported that private school choice programs do a
disservice to students with disabilities because they often have little oversight in the services they
provide, and they typically charge greater tuition than the amount of the voucher or tax-credit
pays.141
Justices Opinions. Justice Alito argued that although today’s public schools were very
different from schools of the past, public schools still fall short of reassuring parents of different
faiths that the local school does not promote a worldview different from their own. Referencing
Horace Mann and the evolution of public schools in the United States, Justice Alito wrote,
“Mann’s goal was to ‘Americanize’ the incoming Catholic immigrants. In fact, he and other
proponents of the common-school movement used language and made insinuations that today
would be considered far more inflammatory.”142 Just as Justice Alito illuded to the indoctrination
of students to worldly ways, Justice Sotomayor countered by arguing that some teachers in
religiously affiliated schools are actual “ministers who inculcate the faith”.143 Sotomayor states
that the majority decision in Espinoza “further slights both our precedents and our history and
weakens this country’s longstanding commitment to a separation of church and state beneficial
to both” and thus she must respectfully disagree with the majority opinion.144
The frequency count for each amici curiae and justice was provided in Figure 7.
Information illustrating how amici and the justices used this theme to help frame arguments
related to the religion clause subtheme is displayed in Table 19.

141

Brief for National Disability Rights Network, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent. Espinoza
v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6743, *41.
142
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2271 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
143
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2297 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
144
Ibid at 2292.
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Table 19
Human Interest Matrix: Sub-Theme School Choice
Case
Liberty Justice Center

National Disability Rights
Network

Position

Excerpt

Reverse

“Other children may look like most of their classmates, but some find themselves socially
isolated or friendless because of their adherence to religious principles. They are bullied
for not participating in the majoritarian activities of students at their public school:
smoking e-cigarettes and marijuana, consuming alcohol underage, and sexting.”145

Affirm

“Since enacting the IDEA in 1975, Congress has repeatedly enhanced it. But privateschool voucher and tax credit programs, including the Montana program at issue in this
case, risk arresting that progress and restoring the earlier era—during which millions of
students with disabilities were barely educated, deprived of support and services, and
segregated from their peers.”146

Justice Alito

Concurring

“This history is well-known and has been recognized in opinions of this Court. A wave of
immigration in the mid-19th century, spurred in part by potato blights in Ireland and
Germany, significantly increased this country’s Catholic population. Nativist fears
increased with it. An entire political party, the Know Nothings, formed in the 1850s.”147

Justice Sotomayor

Dissenting

“Neither differential treatment nor coercion exists here because the Montana Supreme
Court invalidated the tax-credit program entirely. Because no secondary school (secular or
sectarian) is eligible for benefits, the state court’s ruling neither treats petitioners
differently based on religion nor burdens their religious exercise. Petitioners remain free
to send their children to the religious school of their choosing and to exercise their
faith.”148

145
Brief for the Liberty Justice Center and American Federation for Children as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5118, *15.
146
Brief for National Disability Rights Network, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct.
2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6743, *18.
147
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2269 (2020) (Alito, J., concurring).
148
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2293 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Morality Frame
This frame placed the event, problem, or issue in context of religious tenets, moral
prescriptions, or the US Constitution/State Constitutions. It usually contained a moral message or
prescription about how to behave or believe. The emerging theme identified in this frame was
constitution.
Constitution
Constitution in this context referred to how amici and justice’s lent special status to
certain state and federal laws designed to promote or restrict issues concerning state rights,
religious liberty and church-state separation issues, and other issues concerning the interpretation
of the United States Constitution. Some amici and justices promoted strong adherence to the
Courts interpretation of the Religion Clauses as outlined in Everson, while others promote a
loose interpretation of the clauses. Nine petitioners, eight respondents, and seven justices
referenced this emerging theme. Chief Justice Roberts referenced this theme 27 times while
Justice Sotomayor referenced this emerging theme six times. The Cato Institute referenced this
theme nine times and the Public Funds Public Schools referenced the theme 23 times.
Amicus Briefs. The divide on constitutional issues was not limited to the justices.
The Cato Institute, for example, contended that the tax credit scholarship that Montana proposed
to implement on its face value was neutral in respect to the Establishment Clause. The Cato
Institute argued, however, that Blaine Amendments like the one in Montana’s state constitution
fueled the ideological conflict between supporters and non-supporters of school choice. Amici
for the Cato Institute argued:
Montana’s Blaine Amendment can generate three results. First, when it serves to forestall
any expenditure constituting an establishment – something equally disallowed under the
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First Amendment – it is perfectly benign and serves as a valuable restatement of federal
constitutional principles. The Tax Credit Program is not such an expenditure.149
Opposing the Cato Institute, Public Funds Public Schools contended that Montana’s Blaine
Amendment was designed by the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention solely “to ensure that
public funds be used solely to fund public schools, in order to safeguard Montana’s mandate to
provide its children a quality public education.”150 Amici for Public Funds Public Schools argued
that the intent of Section 6 of the Montana State Constitution was to ensure that the state had the
finest public school system accessible to all children in the state.151
Justices Opinions. The justices were also divided on many constitutional tenets. Justice
Sotomayor contended that the Constitution does not require Montana to create a tax credit
incentive. She maintained that the Court in Espinoza inappropriately mandated that Montana
reinstate a tax credit program that was not required by the state’s constitution. She goes on to
argue that “Not only is the Court wrong to decide this case at all, it decides it wrongly.”152 Chief
Justice Roberts asserts that the Court has standing, and strict scrutiny must be applied because
“When otherwise eligible recipients are disqualified from a public benefit ‘solely because of
their religious character’, we must apply strict scrutiny.”153
The frequency count for each amici curiae and justice is provided in Figure 8.
Information illustrating how amici and the justices used this theme to help frame arguments
related to the religion clause subtheme was displayed in Table 20.

Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4450, *9.
150
Brief for Public Funds Public Schools as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza v.
Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6536, *11.
151
Mont. Const. Art. X, § 6 (Nexis Uni current through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
152
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2292 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
153
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2260 (2020).
149
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Table 20
Morality Frame Matrix: Sub-Theme Constitution
Case

Position

Excerpt

The Cato Institute

Reverse

“While this Court has never found the government’s footing to be so narrow as to
constitutionalize the entire field of relations between church and state, it has never been hesitant
to offer correction when states fall on the side of either establishment or burdens on free
exercise.”154

Public Funds Public Schools

Affirm

“Constitution—the ‘no-aid’ clause—was debated, revised, and enacted as a result of Montana’s
well-documented 1972 constitutional reform process. Petitioners and Amici in support of
Petitioners focus the lion’s share of their briefing on constitutional debate and historical context
from the 1800s. That is not the relevant inquiry. The meaning, intent, and popular understanding
of Section 6 derive from the 1972 Constitutional Convention, from a statewide ratification
process, and from Section 6’s role as an integral part of the state constitution’s guarantee of a
system of free, quality public education.”155

Chief Justice Roberts

Concurring

“Here too Montana’s no-aid provision bars religious schools from public benefits solely because
of the religious character of the schools. The provision also bars parents who wish to send their
children to a religious school from those same benefits, again solely because of the religious
character of the school. This is apparent from the plain text. The provision bars aid to any school
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.”156

Justice Sotomayor

Dissenting

“Today’s ruling is perverse. Without any need or power to do so, the Court appears to require a
State to reinstate a tax-credit program that the Constitution did not demand in the first place. We
once recognized that [w]hile the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to
deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the
machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.”157

154
Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015),
2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4450, *8.
155
Brief for Public Funds Public Schools as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020)
(No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6536, *8-9.
156
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2255 (2020).
157
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2297 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided a summary of the findings of this study. First, I reviewed the
coding process, provided a brief description of the frames used to code data, and presented the
results of intra-rater reliability. A brief background of the amici curiae and Supreme Court
Justices was provided for each of the 18 amici selected for this study, as well as each justice who
served on the Supreme Court when Espinoza was decided. Results of research questions one and
two were also reported. In addition, the emerging themes identified in each coding frame were
addressed. In the next chapter I will discuss findings and the relevancy of the findings to the use
of amicus briefs to influence educational policy via the United States Supreme Court.

119

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this study five generic frames introduced by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) were
analyzed to determine the dominant policy frames interest groups used to frame policy
preferences in the United States Supreme Court’s landmark case Espinoza v. Montana (2020).158
A second purpose of this study was to ascertain if these same frames emerged in the written
opinions of the United States Supreme Court justices. This study aimed to answer the following
two research questions:
RQ1. What dominant policy frames do interest groups use to frame policy preferences
in Espinoza v. Montana (2020)?
RQ2. Which (if any) policy frames found in the amicus briefs emerge in the written
opinions of the justices in Espinoza v. Montana (2020).
Discussion
The a priori codes identified at the start of this study are based on Semetko and
Valkenburg’s (2000) five generic frames – the attribution of responsibility frame, conflict frame,
economic consequences frame, human interest frame, and morality frame. The researcher coded
1005 references across 18 amicus briefs and 180 across seven written justices’ opinions for a
total of 1185 references. The documents were coded on two separate occasions resulting in an
.85 intra-rater reliability. Dominant frames were identified for petitioners and respondents and
for the written opinions of the Supreme Court justices (Figure 9). Subthemes coded to each
dominant frame were also identified using NVivo software. Based on this information each case
was reviewed to determine which dominant frames and common themes emerged from the text.

158

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
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Dominant Frames
The most dominant frame was the human-interest frame. Petitioners, respondents, and
justices personalized stories about people facing harrowing situations or events that effected their
lives. For example, Justice Gorsuch emphasized the lead petitioners single mother status who
worked three jobs, and simply wanted to use the scholarship money to send her daughters to an
accredited religious school.159 Amici for Liberty Justice Center described a Jewish family who
wanted to raise their children in their faith but could not afford to send their children to private
religious school without assistance from the tax credit scholarship fund.160 Amici for the Georgia
Goal Scholarship Program highlighted what they perceived as devasting effects public schools
have had on black communities by describing the historical impact segregated education had on
the social and emotional learning of black students which still exist today in segregated urban
black communities.161 Conversely, the National Disability Rights Network (NDRN) described
students with disabilities who are denied access to private schools.162 They also emphasized that
many students with disabilities who do use vouchers or tax credits to attend private schools lose
federal protection under the Individuals with Disability Education Act (2004).163
The next dominant frame across the amicus briefs and justices’ opinions was the conflict
frame. Though private schools emerged as an overall theme within this frame, the primary focus
of both concurring and dissenting justices was on how the Montana Supreme Court struck down
the Tax Credit Program, thus denying parents the opportunity to send their students to private

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2274 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Brief for the Liberty Justice Center and American Federation for Children as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs Lexis 5118, *8-9.
161
Brief for Georgia Goal Scholarship Program, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Espinoza
v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), Briefs Lexis 4465. *12.
162
Brief for National Disability Rights Network, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent. Espinoza
v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6743, *19.
163
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2004).
159
160
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school programs of their choice. Chief Justice Roberts contended that there was no violation of
the Establishment Clause but argued that when the Montana Department of Revenue enacted
Rule 1, the rule singled out faith-based institutions from receiving generally available public
funds based on religious status – which was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.164
Contesting Justice Roberts position, Justice Ginsburg posited that in so far as the
Montana Supreme Court eliminated the tax credit program all together there could not possibly
be any violation of the Free Exercise Clause.165 Furthermore, petitioners and respondents tended
to focus more on Blaine Amendments and no-aid clauses as opposed to the Religion Clauses.
Amici for the Tennessee Education Association argued that striking down Montana’s “no-aid”
clause without proof that it was motivated by anti-Catholic sentiment based on the failed 1875
Blaine Amendment would cause harm to public schools by diverting much needed funds to the
private sector.166
The attribution of responsibility frame closely mirrored the conflict frame. In large part
the primary focus was on the Religion Clauses in which one side or the other placed blame on
the following:
1) The Court for its failure to fully clarify its position on the Religion Clause (some
arguing that the Court often sat on the fence),
2) The Montana Supreme Court for what is perceived as a fallacious ruling when it struck
down the tax credit program.
3) The states for holding onto no-aid statutes in state constitutions, and the inconsistent
rulings between the Circuit courts.

Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2252 (2020).
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2278 (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
166
Brief for the Tennessee Education Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents. Espinoza
v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 6590, *3.
164
165
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Amici for EdChoice reasoned that state legislatures enact school choice programs knowing that
they were likely to face challenges in one of the Circuit courts arguing that the “deep split”
between the Circuit courts created confusion and left students who rely on student aid to attend
schools of choice in limbo.167 EdChoice argued that “The deep constitutional uncertainty
manifested by the decision of the Montana Supreme Court and those of other federal and state
courts is limiting the ability or inclination of states to provide a full range of educational options
for America’s children.”168
The second least dominant frame was the economic consequence frame. Neither Justice
Alito nor Justice Thomas referenced this frame, and most of the petitioners and respondents only
fleetingly acknowledged economic benefits to parents and students – or negative impacts to
public school funds as an obstacle. This is surprising considering that tax credits, tax credit
scholarships, and school voucher programs are often proposed as ways to help alleviate parents
of what some see as a form of “double taxation,” or as a means to shift public funds to private
schools. The amici for the Georgia Goal Scholarship Program, for example, argued that
historically African Americans have paid “twice” for their children’s education.169 Referencing
the Rosenwald program of the early twentieth century in which blacks matched contributions to
build rural black schools while “whites all over the South seized the school funds belonging to
the disenfranchised black citizen…black parents had no choice but to pay both direct and indirect
‘voluntary’ taxes for the public education of their children.”170Amici for Georgia Scholarship
argued that this was a system of double taxation. The Cato Institute, argued in favor of tax credit

167
Brief for EdChoice, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners. Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4461, *16.
168
Ibid at 10.
169
Brief for Georgia Goal Scholarship Program, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Espinoza
v. Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), Briefs Lexis 4465. *34.
170
Ibid at 33-34.
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programs, extended this argument to devout parents who amici claim are forced to pay twice for
their child’s education.171 Amici for the Cato Institute argued that “…initiatives like the Tax
Credit Program work to rectify a deep structural unfairness in which devout parents pay twice,
once for the secular public education made available through their tax dollars, and again for the
parochial education their consciences demand.”172
The least referred to frame, the morality frame, pertains to moral messaging, God, and the
Constitution. Since Espinoza is a case that involves the Free Exercise Clause and the use of tax
credit scholarship money for use at private religious-based schools, it was expected that this
frame would be one of the more dominant frames. Justice Alito and the National Disability
Network, however, did not reference this frame at all. The other amici and justices mainly
discussed it in legal terms of what the government can and cannot do in relation to the Free
Exercise Clause. Across the briefs and written opinions, there was little discussion as to what
constitutes moral behavior outside of violating one of the tenets of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses. Justice Gorsuch, for example, used this frame when he asserted that in cases like
Espinoza government does not force individuals to forgo their religious convictions but,
“Individuals are forced only to choose between forgoing state aid or pursuing some aspect of
their faith. The government does not put a gun to the head, only a thumb on the scale.”173 He
argued that the Free Exercise Clause cannot tolerate either situation, or to do so meets the
demand of strict scrutiny by the Court.174 The researcher expected with the number of religious
organizations submitting briefs, there would be some conversation about honoring God and

171
Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Espinoza v. Montana Dep’t of
Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020) (No. 01-1015), 2019 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 4450, *7.
172
Ibid.
173
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2278 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
174
Ibid.

125

one’s duty to country by ensuring a religious-based education for children – public or private.
Use of Amicus Briefs to Influence Courts
Most studies focusing on the use of amicus briefs to influence the Court focus on the
increase in the number of amicus briefs filed in the past 20 or so years. Kearney and Merrill
(2000) noted in their seminal research on the influence of amicus briefs on the United States
Supreme Court that the use of amicus briefs in the period from 1946-1995 had increased 800%.
Collins (2004) noted that during this same period amicus curiae often formed alliances with other
interest groups and individual policy actors as co-signers on briefs, so the actual number of
participants also increased significantly. Despite the increase in the use of amicus briefs by
interest groups to lobby the Court, it is unclear to what extent amicus briefs influence the Court.
Yet, the question of interest group influence is essential to our understanding of their role in the
policy-decision making process.
The most important component for understanding how amicus curiae influence the court
is through the examination of the content of the amicus briefs and court opinions. It is through
the amicus brief process that interest groups frame their arguments in their effort to influence the
outcome of a case. It is also arguably through the written opinions of the justices that the Court
contributes to legal and social policy – including policy that may shape educational outcomes.
Focusing only on the number of briefs submitted before the Court or case outcomes skirts the
obvious question of how amici curiae leverage language to frame policy preferences to influence
the Court, or equally important, our understanding of how justices craft the content of their
opinions.
The use of language to shape policy can be found in the hidden frames that amici use to
form their arguments. Interest groups strategically emphasis certain frames in order to gain
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support for their preferred policy preferences while minimizing other aspects of an argument.
Scholars agree that how an issue is framed can influence how individuals respond to an issue –
including Supreme Court justices. Frames can sway the public, individuals, or groups toward a
policy preference and potentially effect policy outcomes. According to Gamson (1992), a frame
is a powerful social tool that when encoded just right stirs emotions and brings attention to an
idea or concept that would otherwise go unnoticed by the public – in essence it is a manufactured
response (my term). A manufactured response is one designed to illicit intense emotions by an
interest group, organization, or individual explicitly to create a desired reaction or outcome from
the targeted audience. Ideas such as tax credits, student scholarship funds, and school vouchers
are concepts that when framed as forms of school choice invoke intense emotions from the
targeted audience. These words are molded and shaped through the framing process by interest
groups and policy elites to elicit a manufactured response from the target audience.
Contribution to the Literature
This qualitative content analysis contributes to the literature by adding a study based on
five generic frames first introduced by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) to the analysis of amicus
briefs and Supreme Court Justices written opinions. The use of Semetko and Valkenburg’s
(2000) generic frames have been used in a variety of studies on topics ranging from autism to
climate change. To my knowledge, this study is the first study to utilize frame analysis to
identify dominant frames and emerging themes in amicus briefs or justices written opinions. As
Collins, et al. (2015) have noted, the focus by researchers on the content interest groups use to
frame policy preferences communicated in amicus briefs is relatively new and not fully
understood. Most studies primarily focus on the extent to which amicus briefs add new
information to the case, or they provide a count of the number of social science citations
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referenced in the briefs, but systematic studies of the documents content for frames or themes are
limited especially in education policy (Collins, 2007; Collins, 2008; Collins, et al., 2015;
Hazelton, et al., 2019).
In addition to applying Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames to identify
policy preferences of amici, this study also illustrates the use of NVivo data analysis software as
a useful tool in implementing qualitative content analysis in studies related to the judicial arena
and education policy. Quantitative analysis strives for objective systematic quantification of data
(i.e., statistical analysis) to describe the content of material. Qualitative content analysis,
conversely, allows for the researcher to move away from objectivity while allowing for “the
subjective interpretation of the content of data text through the systematic classification process
of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). The use of data
software like NVivo allows for the systematic organization of the data set, thus allowing for a
sequential review of the material while maintaining coding consistency and transparency.
Numerous scholars have pointed to the advantages of using qualitative data software to aid
research, but few researchers in the field of education policy studies have heeded the call.
Limitations
This study has certain limitation’s that should be noted. First, this dissertation primary
focus was on the United States Supreme Court case Espinoza v. Montana (2020).175 Its
applicability to other court cases should be called into question. A much broader study must be
undertaken before the results of this study can be generalized to other court cases. Currently, a
similar case has made its way to the United States Supreme Court, Carson v. Makin, No. 1:18CV-327-DBH (D. Me.). A similar study that identifies the frames amici used to frame policy
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Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
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preferences in that case compared to the results of this study would provide additional evidence
to better understand how frames used by amici may influence judicial outcomes.
Second, qualitative content analysis involves intense and time-consuming research even
with the assistance of computer added software programs. Identifying frames is a challenging
task that often requires the coder to read and reread data multiple times before deciding on which
code best fits the text. Qualitative content analysis is largely subjective and open to interpretation
which is why it is best to employ multiple coders. Unfortunately, with this study due to time
constraints it was not possible to use a second coder. In addition, this study was limited to
identifying only dominant frames and the major sub-theme within each frame. A further
exploration of how other subthemes might relate to the larger frame should be undertaken to
possibly identify other emerging frames.
Another limitation was the sample size. As mentioned above, qualitative research is
extremely time consuming. In Espinoza forty-five amicus briefs were submitted before the Court
for review. Only 18 amicus briefs were analyzed in this study. While I was able to identify codes
within the sample size for generic frames and reach thematic saturation, coding all the briefs
related to the case may have identified broader themes within the data. For example, it might
have identified new frames as well as broader themes across the data set that shed new light on
how amici use frames to potentially influence policy preference outcomes. In addition, including
the additional briefs would have made it easier to identify differences among interest groups and
organizational types. For example, only one think tank organization was included in this study
limiting the researcher’s ability to compare frames across or between organization types.
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Recommendations for Future Research
This study provides the basis for further inquiry related to framing amicus briefs and
judicial written opinions. One area where this research could benefit is in the expansion of the
number of court cases and amicus briefs included in a single study. A future study might
incorporate a larger number of briefs across multiple cases to provide a more comprehensive
picture of the influence amici have on the Court as well as how the framing of issues emerges
across cases. In addition, a larger number of briefs across multiple cases will provide the
researcher with a broader group of organizational types (think tanks, NGOs, faith-based
organizations, labor, and industry related groups, etc.) to compare. In addition, the research may
be able to expand the type of document analysis conducted by analyzing oral arguments, petition
for writ of certiorari, brief on merits, brief of respondents, as well as documents related to lower
court decisions. Tracing how amici policy frames change across court venues would add to the
understanding of how amici frame policy preferences for a targeted audience.
Future research specific to the conceptual framework utilized in this study can also be
beneficial. To this researcher’s knowledge, frame analysis has not been applied to the study of
amicus briefs or judicial written opinions in any extensive manner. One exception to this
observation is Collins, et al. (2015) study which used plagiarism software to conduct a content
analysis of judicial written opinions. Collin, et. al. (2015) used this information to determine if
justices incorporated the written language of the amicus briefs into their majority opinions and to
determine if any particular amici are more influential than others. Beyond this study the content
analysis of Supreme Court opinions is limited especially in how judicial decision making may
influence education policy. Furthermore, Collins, et al (2015) study did not assess how amici
develop or choose frames to shape their policy preferences.
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This brings me to my final recommendation for future studies. As Collins (2004) has
pointed out, amicus curiae often form alliances with other interest groups and individual policy
actors as co-signers on briefs. So, while the number of briefs submitted to the Court is increasing
– so too, are the actual number of participants. In this study alone, I evaluated 18 briefs, but more
than half of the briefs evaluated had at least one co-signer for a total of 68 participants. One brief
alone had 16 co-signers. A study that examines why groups collaborate, how they come to agree
on language contained within the brief, do they share the same overall ideology on different
subject matters, and do single signer briefs or briefs with multiple co-signers have more sway
with the court? These are just some of the questions future researchers may want to consider.
Implications
The findings of this qualitative content analysis have implications for policymakers,
interest groups, and researchers. This study attempted to provide some insight into how amici
curiae acting on behalf of interest groups have used frame analysis to shape the debate on various
public and private school choice options to influence the United States Supreme Court justices
toward favorable policy outcomes.
One implication for educational policymakers, is that very few studies identifying or
analyzing how interest groups attempt to influence educational policymakers has been
conducted. Therefore, little information on how educational policymakers are targeted by interest
group messaging and framing of issues is available to help researchers understand the degree to
which policy decisions are influenced by interest groups – that is, if decisions are influenced at
all by interest groups. Policymakers need to be aware of how outside interest groups can
influence decisions to ensure that decisions are made in a fair and equitable manner – and not
manipulated to favor one group over another.
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A second implication for interest groups is that more research is required to determine if
amicus briefs influence justices’ decisions. Filing an amicus brief may, according to Collins, et
al. (2015) satisfy the interests’ groups base, but the cost associated with filing a brief can be
expensive. To ensure that any amount of money spent on filing a brief has a positive return on
investment further research in this area is required. In addition, the types of frames interest
groups use to influence justices needs further investigation. A cross study of Supreme Court
cases or a study that traces the history of a case from the lower court to the higher court would
add tremendously to our understanding of how interest groups use frames to influence judicial
outcomes.
As for researchers, a deeper dive into the data is required before one can determine if
amici curiae influenced the outcome of Espinoza. This study has revealed that despite the
perceived impact the Court has on shaping education policy, studies on the policy frames interest
groups use in amicus briefs to communicate their policy preferences before the Court are
incomplete. Without further exploration it is difficult to make the connection between interest
groups and judicial outcomes – or to understand the intricacies of the processes involved.
Considering that in the past twenty years the United States Supreme Court has issued several
significant education-related decisions that have shaped education policy nationally, it seems
logical that researchers could benefit from gaining a better understanding of this process. This
study demonstrates the viability of using frame analysis to help researchers develop a better
understanding how interest groups attempt to influence Supreme Court decisions by means of the
amicus brief process (Collins, 2008).
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Conclusion
This qualitative content analysis attempted to provide insight into how amici acting on
behalf of interest groups have used frame analysis to shape the debate on various school choice
options to influence the United States Supreme Court towards favorable policy outcomes. This
study used Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames as a priori codes to compare the
amicus briefs and judicial opinions in Espinoza to facilitate this analysis. Although it is
inconclusive to say that there was a direct influence between the briefs and the justices’ written
opinions, it is without a doubt that Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000) generic frames can be
applied to the content analysis of amicus briefs and justices written opinions in a variety of
interdisciplinary fields. It is through frame analysis that new frames and emerging themes can be
identified that researchers may find helpful in better understanding how amici influence the
Courts decisions and ultimately education policy outcomes.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A
NVIVO FRAMEWORK PLANNING GUIDE

DATA TYPES

Amicus briefs
Espinoza v.
Montana
N = 45
n = 18 (used
for study)

UNITS OF
ANALYSIS

VARIABLES

Individual briefs

Petitioners
(reverse)
Respondents
(affirm)
Concur
Dissent
Type of
organization
Ideology

Individual justices
written opinions

TIME
(will this be a
longitudinal study,
pre/post interviews or
repeated over time?)

Snapshot of one
case heard before
the United States
Supreme Court
(Espinoza v.
Montana, 2020)

CODING
FRAMEWORK

Framing
a priori codes

Identify
Dominant Frames
(5 generic
frames)
Attribution of
Responsibility
Frame

Supreme Court
Justices written
opinions in case

Conflict Frame
Economic
Consequences
Frame

N=7

Human Interest
Frame
Morality Frame

Identify dominant
emerging theme
within each
frame

Note. NVivo planning guide as part of the audit trail
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE OF MY REFLECTION NOTES
(Uploaded from my notations in NVivo as I conducted the study.)
Completed frame design document - good document to have to help maintain focus. I have my
documents ready to upload into NVivo and start coding. I can't help but feel like this might be a
long journey. It will take a tremendous amount of time to code each brief.
As I began coding my first brief, I realized I needed to narrow the code unit. I decided to narrow
it by paragraph. I think initially coding the paragraph to one of the five frames will work best.
Afterword’s I can come back and reevaluate the code and expand the code, add new codes, etc.
as determined.
Just as I suspected - coding is going slowly. I really want to make sure that I evaluate each
document thoroughly before moving on to the next document. This may take more time than I
actually built into my research design. I think instead of taking two to three days to code each
document I will have to speed up the process and spend no more than 2 days on each brief. The
justice’s opinion are a bit easier to code - once you get through the legal jargon and legal
citations.
I will need to figure out how I want to manage paragraphs that can fit more than one code. I
assume I will run into this issue with virtually every brief. My initial thoughts, however, are to
continue coding the briefs paragraphs to one code and revisit during my second cycle coding. So
far, most of the paragraphs are fitting predominantly one frame - But, at some point I may have
to consider choosing which frame best fits the paragraph.
Decided to only code the argument section of the document. The front matter and back matter
are redundant. I will do this for all briefs and justices’ opinions.
I am also not going to code headings and section titles - at least until I discuss this with Dr.
Driscoll. As for references to law - I will likely come back and code them into a points of law
code that I will add later. I need to double check and think it through with Dr. Driscoll. Also,
references to social science research and historical research is prevalent throughout the
documents. I can see several papers emerging from this project (i.e., what cases are these guys
citing and how; what about the social science research - who, what and how are they citing it...?)
Just thoughts about future research. I think this is something that can be done with another
project - maybe for a paper later.
Went ahead and added US Constitution to Morality Frame as an emerging theme because it is
often referenced as a code of behavior by petitioner’s and respondents - justices are referencing it
too.
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I am seeing potentially new codes emerging from the briefs. Ran NVivo auto code just to see
what the program identified - and it picked up on several themes I was noticing as I coded. I
think I will add "constitution" as an emerging code under the morality frame.
Need to either create separate codes for Religion Clauses and Blaine Amendments or develop
theme/collapse into another code.
Protestant hegemony - how to code - add to multiple codes or collapse into a theme????
Georgia - brief mentions ACE program and compares it to religious teaching - should there be a
separate code or theme? This is an extremely interesting comparison. Religious teachings of
private-faith-based programs v. Character Education in the public schools. Raises several
interesting points about who should be responsible for teaching moral character/behavior.
Cato Institute brief brings up an interesting point about humanist thinking - may have to merge
with morality frame or develop a new code. I have come across this concept in several different
formats in the briefs. While these ideas may be in conflict - I can't help but wonder if they are not
just the other side of the same code.
In Am. Fed brief - question of standing raises some concern because it is primarily arguing that it
hurts certain group organizations economically, i.e., economic consequence frame - yet it can be
a conflict as well. I will have to put some thought into whether to code this as a conflict frame,
economic consequence frame, or both frames.
Brief of Baptiste Joint Committee brief primarily outlines the historic background of 1st Amend
Religion Clauses - aside from a review of history and declaration that petitioners did not have
standing - not sure if this isn't one of those briefs that judges proport to be nonessential - it
primarily focus on historic conflict with Blaine Amendment and reported position in terms of
historic events. I'm not sure how this helped the Court come to a decision.
After careful reflection I realize that sometime justices may not know all the background of a
situation - or the history related to it. I now see why the Baptiste Joint Committee laid out the
history. They did do a decent job relating it to current situation.
I am very pleased with the outcomes of the auto coding. NVivo identified several emerging
themes that I suspected would emerge from the data as I have been coding. It’s nice to have
some affirmation - even if it's from a computer program. With the help of auto code, I have
identified some pretty interesting emerging themes. I can see them in the way the justices and
amici talk/write about different issues.
I have now identified five major emerging themes for each of the five frames. I like the way this
came together. Now I just need to think about what it all means. I am finding that reflecting on
the process is very helpful for helping me sort ideas and thoughts about the meaning of the data.
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Trying to determine if I should use NVivo’s visualizations (charts, graphs, etc.) or export to
Excel. NVivo’s charts are OK - but I like how they look in the Excel program. Now I have to
figure out what this all means and how it relates to the research questions.
I decided to export the data summary tables to Excel to create my graphs and charts. Now - time
to think about what they mean and to look deeper at what the amici and justices are saying.
Framing is about the communication - let's find out how they are communicating their ideas and
if the ideas are resonating with the justices.
Interesting outcomes for dominant frames - who would have thought the human-interest frame
would be at the top followed by the conflict frame. I guess I expected the economic
consequences frame to dominant the five generic frames - but it’s only second to the morality
frame (which I also thought would be in the top three).
Completed by graphs, charts, and analysis. Time for more reflection before I jump back into
writing. I need to pull excerpts from the data based on the dominant frame and emerging themes
to review how amici are "talking" about the issue amongst each other and with the justices (i.e.,
via their written communications/stories contained in the briefs). I see these as stories now - very
interesting!
Now I need to go tell the story
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APPENDIX C
SAMPLE ANNOTATIONS
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE OF MY THEMATIC CLUSTER MATRIX
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VITA
Anita F. Morgan was born and raised in Northern Illinois. Anita attended Northern
Illinois University where she earned her baccalaureate degree in history. Anita graduated summa
cum laude from the history department and was invited to deliver the commencement speech.
Anita was offered several graduate assistantships to continue her education in history. She earned
a master’s degree in history and later pursued her doctoral studies in United States economic
history in a joint program sponsored between Northern Illinois University and the University of
Chicago. While at Northern Illinois University she served as Director of the Social Science
Teacher Education Program and taught several education methods courses.
Anita always had a heart for teaching so after several years at Northern Illinois University
she accepted an offer to return to the classroom and teach AP history at Main South High School.
However, when Anita and her family moved to Knoxville, TN., Anita returned to teaching
history at the collegial level. Anita taught US and Western Civilization at both Roane State
Community College and Pellissippi Technical Community College in Knoxville, TN. During this
time Anita also earned a second master’s degree in Special Education at the University of
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